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Thomas W. Merrillt
In 1984, the Supreme Court adopted a new framework for determining
when courts should defer to interpretations of statutes by administrative agen-
cies. Previous decisions had looked to multiple contextual factors in answering
this question.' Chevron U.S., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc.2 appeared to reject this approach and require that federal courts defer to
any reasonable interpretation by an agency charged with administration of a
statute, provided Congress has not clearly specified a contrary answer. The
Court justified this new general rule of deference by positing that Congress has
implicitly delegated interpretative authority to all agencies charged with enforc-
ing federal law.
3
Chevron is widely regarded as a kind of "counter-Marbury" for the admin-
istrative state Indeed, read for all it is worth, the decision would make admin-
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istrative actors the primary interpreters of federal statutes and relegate courts
to the largely inert role of enforcing unambiguous statutory terms. This in turn
would have enormous implications for the overall balance of power among the
three branches of government. Executive branch agencies would gain new
power to achieve rapid changes in policy through reinterpretation of their
legislative authority; courts would play a diminished role in checking agency
aggrandizement and in protecting reliance interests associated with past interpre-
tations; and Congress, unable to rely on the courts to honor unstated institution-
al understandings, could react by enacting excruciatingly detailed statutes or
intensifying the use of oversight hearings.
This Article has two primary tasks. The first, which is the subject of Parts
I, II, and HI, is to determine whether Chevron in fact operates in the Supreme
Court as the "counter-Marbury" portrayed by commentators. It turns out that
the Court does not regard Chevron as a universal test for determining when to
defer to executive interpretations: the Chevron framework is used in only about
half the cases that the Court perceives as presenting a deference question. Nor
have the multiple factors identified in the pre-Chevron period disappeared; to
the contrary, the Court continues to rely upon them in many cases, despite their
apparent irrelevance under Chevron. Perhaps most strikingly, in recent Terms
the application of Chevron has resulted in less deference to executive interpreta-
tions than was the case in the pre-Chevron era. Thus, instead of functioning
as a "counter-Marbury," there are signs that Chevron is being transformed by
the Court into a new judicial mandate "to say what the law is.''5 I will argue
that the failure of Chevron to perform as expected can be attributed to the
Court's reluctance to embrace the draconian implications of the doctrine for the
balance of power among the branches, and to practical problems generated by
its all-or-nothing approach to the deference question.
The second task of the Article is to propose an alternative to Chevron that
avoids its theoretical and practical failings and is more congruent with the
actual practice of the Supreme Court. Part IV sets forth what I call the "execu-
tive precedent model." The root idea is that executive interpretations should
be viewed as a form of precedent and integrated into the process of statutory
construction in much the same way that judicial precedent is integrated. The
model begins with the understanding that both the executive branch and the
judicial branch have inherent authority to interpret enacted law-and thus to
generate "precedent" construing that law. The model then posits that the judicial
power includes not only the power to determine whether to follow past judicial
precedent interpreting enacted law, but also the power to determine what weight
to give to past executive precedent construing that law. Under the proposed
model, courts would treat executive precedent approximately the same way they
regard the precedent of another court of coordinate jurisdiction: as prima facie
5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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correct, and as entitled to more or less deference depending on various contex-
tual factors (such as the thoroughness with which the executive agency consid-
ered the issue, how long the executive interpretation has been followed, and
so forth).
Part V compares Chevron's deference model and the executive precedent
model. Chevron rests on a principle of mandatory deference: courts are com-
pelled to defer to agency interpretations because Congress has directed them
to defer. The executive precedent model, in contrast, rests on a principle of
discretionary deference: courts defer to executive interpretations because sound
judicial decisionmaking requires that they follow the precedent of a coordinate
branch of government. I contend that the discretionary deference principle
implicit in the executive precedent model fits better within the constitutional
and legal framework that gave rise to the modern administrative state, provides
a unifying theory explaining why the traditional factors supposedly banished
by Chevron are relevant and how they relate to ordinary modes of judicial
interpretation, and offers better incentives than does Chevron for principled
decisionmaking by courts, agencies, and Congress.
I. CHEVRON: THE REVOLUTION ON PAPER
The attitude of courts toward administrative interpretations of statutes has
ranged between two extremes. 6 At one pole, courts ignore the administrative
view. When operating in this "independent judgment" mode, a court employs
traditional tools of statutory interpretation-analysis of text, legislative history,
and various canons of construction-to arrive at what it regards as the best
interpretation of the statute, just as it would in a case where the executive
branch has not spoken previously. At the other pole, courts frame the inquiry
in terms of whether the administrative interpretation is one that a reasonable
interpreter might embrace. In this "deference" mode, a court implicitly ac-
knowledges that the statute is susceptible to multiple readings. The task of the
court is viewed not as discovering the best interpretation, but rather as assuring
that the executive view does not contradict the statute and otherwise furthers
legitimate objectives.
Chevron is widely understood to mark a significant transformation in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence of deference. This part spells out the support
6. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.) (noting
two extremes in judicial attitude toward administrative statutory interpretation), aff'd sub nom. Northeast
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 403 (2d ed. 1984) (same); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation
of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 470 (1950) (distinguishing between occasions when courts require agency
interpretations to be "correct" and when they require such interpretations to be merely reasonable). In recent
literature, the standard terms for the two poles, which I will use here, are "independent judgment" and
"deference." See, e.g.. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Adminis-
trative State, 89 CoL%1. L. REv. 452, 453-54 & n.10 (1989); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1983).
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for this view by briefly examining the pre-Chevron decisional law and contrast-
ing it with the framework set forth in Chevron. After describing the revolution-
ary potential of Chevron, I will turn in the next part to a consideration of how
Chevron has in fact affected the practice of the Supreme Court.
A. Pre-Chevron: The Multiple Factors Regime
Prior to 1984, the Supreme Court had no unifying theory for determining
when to defer to agency interpretations of statutes.7 The approach was instead
pragmatic and contextual. One feature of the Court's practice was that deference
could range over a spectrum from "great" to "some" to "little" I (although no
attempt was ever made to calibrate different degrees of deference with any
precision). A particularly common approach was to cite the views of those
charged with administration of the statute as one of several reasons for adopting
a particular construction. Thus, the Court might embrace a particular interpreta-
tion (1) because it was supported by the language of the text, (2) because it was
consistent with the legislative history, and (3) because it was the longstanding
construction of the administrative agency.9 To be sure, there were also deci-
sions at the polar extremes during this era-either ignoring the agency view
or treating it as virtually dispositive.10 But in practice, deference existed along
a sliding scale, bridging these outer limits.
In addition, in deciding what degree of deference to give an executive
interpretation, the Court relied on an eclectic cluster of considerations.11 Al-
though there was no explicit rationale linking the various factors together, the
overall approach had an implicit logic. The default rule was one of independent
judicial judgment. Deference to the agency interpretation was appropriate only
if a court could identify some factor or factors that would supply an affirmative
justification for giving special weight to the agency views. Admittedly, the
factors tended to be invoked unevenly. But in this respect, they probably
7. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE
J. ON REG. 1, 6 (1990); Monaghan, supra note 6, at 31.
8. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); 5 DAvis, supra note 6, at 400.
9. For examples of this approach, see Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983); Blum v. Bacon, 457
U.S. 132 (1982); United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555 (1982); Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Comm'n, 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
10. Compare Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (Court
discusses EEOC guidelines with no suggestion that they are entitled to deference) with Heckler v. Campbell,
461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983) (Court states that its review is limited to determining whether Secretary's
regulations are arbitrary or capricious).
11. For useful accounts of the multiple factors employed during this period, see Colin S. Diver,
Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. Rlv. 549, 562 n.95 (1985); Ernest H.
Schopler, Annotation, Supreme Court's View as to Weight and Effect to be Given, on Subsequent Judicial
Construction, to PriorAdministrative Construction of Statute, 39 L.R.A.2d 942 (1975); David R. Woodward




functioned in a manner not too different from the way the canons of interpreta-
tion operate in statutory interpretation cases. 12
The pre-Chevron deference factors may be classified in various ways. For
present purposes, I will group them into three categories: (1) factors addressed
to Congress' interpretative intent (that is, whether Congress intended courts to
defer to an agency's interpretation of a statutory provision); (2) factors ad-
dressed to the attributes of the particular agency decision at issue; and (3)
factors thought to demonstrate congruence between the outcome reached by the
agency and congressional intent regarding that specific issue.
The first factor focused on Congress' probable interpretative intent. The
important distinction was between "legislative rules" and "interpretative
rules." 13 Legislative rules were the product of a specific delegation of authori-
ty from Congress to an administrative agency to interpret a specific statutory
term or fill in a statutory gap. Interpretative rules were executive interpretations
not backed by this type of specific delegated authority. The Supreme Court on
several occasions suggested that interpretations in the former category were
entitled to great deference, but those falling within the latter category were
entitled only to whatever persuasive effect they might have.14
A second group of factors focused not on the agency's authority, but rather
on various attributes of its decision. One factor was whether the issue fell
within an area of agency "expertise."15 The idea was that courts are general-
ists, whereas agencies are specialists. Specialists usually have a better grasp of
technical terms 6 or the practical consequences of a decision," and thus their
views should be given deference by generalists. Another important factor was
the notion that "longstanding," "consistent," or "uniform" administrative inter-
pretations (the terms were used more or less interchangeably) are entitled to
special deference.18 A third factor in this category was that interpretations
12. The dominant view for many years, following Llewellyn, was that the canons are mutually
contradictory, and hence are of little or no value in guiding judicial decisionmaking. See Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). More recently, a revisionist trend has set in, and
commentators have begun to take a more sympathetic attitude toward the canons. See CASS R. SUNsTEiN,
AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 111-92 (1990); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1179.
13. See 5 DAVIS, supra note 6, at 421-25; LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 564-65 (1965); JAMEs M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 146-52 (1938).
14. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. at 466-68 & n.10 (deferring to rule promulgated under
grant of general rulemaking power); Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265,274-75 (1982) (deferring to interpretation
with "legislative effect"); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 & nn.8-9 (1977) (distinguishing
delegated "legislative power" from nondelegated "interpretative power" and according great deference to
agency interpretations using former).
15. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380,390 (1984).
16. See, e.g., E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 134-35 & n.25 (1977).
17. See, e.g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953); Woodward & Levin, supra
note 11, at 332.
18. See United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981);
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,275 (1974); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Compare
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supported by a reasoned analysis were entitled to deference. The most promi-
nent statement to this effect is found in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 9 where the
Court stated that the weight to be given to an agency interpretation will depend
upon "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reason-
ing, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 20 A final
decision-related factor, encountered less often, was whether multiple agencies
agreed or disagreed about the correct interpretation of the statute.
21
A third set of factors was designed to measure the degree to which the
specific outcome reached by an agency was likely to reflect the intent of
Congress. One old idea was that an executive interpretation is entitled to extra
weight "when it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the
men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion."'
Contemporaneous interpretations were thought to be especially probative of
congressional intent, either because the administrators had themselves participat-
ed in the drafting process23 or because such an interpretation was "itself evi-
dence of assumptions-perhaps unspoken by either the administrators or
Congress-brought to a regulatory problem by all involved in its solution."'
In addition, there was the recurrent notion that executive interpretations are
entitled to special deference if they have been ratified in some fashion by
Congress. The notion of what would count as a ratification was never very
precise. The paradigm situation was when Congress, after being informed of
an agency's construction, reenacted a statute without any relevant modifica-
tion. 5
Standing alone, these factors did not comprise, either individually or
collectively, what could be described as a coherent doctrine. No attempt was
made to connect the various factors together or to explain their relevance in
terms of a model of executive-judicial relationship. Indeed, my own attempt
to organize them in functional categories may impose a greater sense of order
than the cases themselves warrant. Moreover, there is little evidence that the
factors had much predictive or constraining power. To take but one example,
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977) (consistently maintained EEOC Guideline given
significant weight by Court) with General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1977) (EEOC
Guideline that conflicts with earlier agency interpretation entitled to little weight).
19. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
20. Id. at 140; see also Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 n.5 (1978) (quoting
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1978); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971).
21. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
at 144-45; see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 664-66 (1984) (discussing a case where
federal agencies adopted conflicting positions on whether a particular substance was "oleomargarine").
22. Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
23. See United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877).
24. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. at 126 (Brennan, J., concurring).
25. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 177 (1981); NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
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in SEC v. Sloan'6 the Securities and Exchange Commission argued that its
interpretation not only was entitled to deference because the interpretation was
longstanding and consistent but also because it had been ratified by Congress
when its construction was cited with approval in a committee report at the time
the statute was reenacted.' The Court rejected these arguments, noting that
the interpretation was not supported by a careful analysis of the statutory
language and that evidence of congressional ratification was not enough if
"based only upon a few isolated statements in the thousands of pages of
legislative documents. ' ' 8
As Sloan suggests, application of the various factors in individual cases is
manipulable. Still, it would be presumptuous to dismiss them as empty rhetoric.
Some factors-such as the importance of longstanding and consistent or
contemporaneous administrative constructions-have been invoked as reasons
for deferring to executive interpretations for over 150 years. 9 Given the
durability of these factors, it is plausible to view them as reflecting deep-seated
judicial intuitions about the kinds of considerations that ought to bear on the
decision to defer. If they do not determine the outcome of cases with logical
certainty, neither does any other "traditional tool" of statutory interpretation.
At least the factors turned the attentions of courts and litigants-including
administrators-toward relevant considerations that presumably shape the
judicial response.
B. The Chevron Framework
Chevron was an unlikely candidate to produce a landmark decision on
deference to executive interpretations of statutes. The government had not
sought a reconsideration of the established approach to judicial review of
administrative interpretations, 0 and only six Justices participated in the deci-
sion. Moreover, the disputed issue could be seen as part of the general deregu-
latory thrust of the early Reagan Administration. In Chevron, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) had defined the term "stationary source" in the Clean
Air Act to permit owners of polluting facilities to treat all emitting devices as
if they were under a single "bubble," thereby minimizing the costs of comply-
26. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
27. Id. at 117-20.
28. Id. at 121.
29. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568,570-71 (1885) (longstanding and contemporaneous
construction); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877) (contemporaneous construction); Edward's
Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827) (contemporaneous construction); United States v.
Vowel, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368, 371 (1809) (longstanding construction); see also Annotation, Effect of
Practical or Administrative Construction of a Statute on Subsequent Judicial Construction, 73 L. Ed. 322
(1929) (citing hundreds of state and federal cases discussing deference to executive views).
30. The United States argued that the "normal rule" of deference should apply, and that the court of
appeals was "fundamentally at odds with the most basic principles of administrative law." See Brief for
the National Resources Defense Council at 19, Chevron (No. 82-1005).
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ing with the emissions standard.3" Just the previous year, in Motor Vehicles
Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual,32 the Court had reacted with
skepticism to a similar deregulatory initiative; thus, it seemed unlikely that the
Court would write a broad prodeference opinion in response to the EPA's
"bubble policy."
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the participating Justices did not
regard Chevron as a departure from prior law. Justice Stevens' opinion for the
Court generated no concurring or dissenting statements protesting or even
remarking on his approach. And in the year following Chevron, the Court
decided nineteen cases involving deference issues, but applied the Chevron
framework only once.33 In time, however, lower courts, agencies, and com-
mentators all came to regard the analysis of the deference question set forth
in Chevron as fundamentally different from that of the previous era. Justice
Stevens' opinion contained several features that can only be described as
"revolutionary," 4 even if no revolution was intended at the time.
Chevron's first important innovation was the prescription of a procedural
formula for courts to follow in determining whether to defer to agency interpre-
tations. Each case, the Court suggested, should proceed in two steps. At step
one, the court would operate in the independent judgment mode. It would ask,
using traditional tools of statutory construction, whether Congress had "directly
spoken to the precise question at issue."35 If the court concluded that Congress
had a "specific intention" 36 with respect to the issue at hand, it would adopt
and enforce that answer. But if the court failed to uncover any such intention,
it would move on to step two, where it would shift into the deference mode.
Here, the question would be whether the agency's position was "a reasonable
interpretation '37 of the statute.
On its face, the two-step formula seems innocuous enough. Indeed, after
the formlessness of the previous era, it offers the beguiling promise of an
orderly method for resolving a wide variety of controversies. What was unclear
at the time, however, was that the two-step inquiry as framed by Chevron
31. 467 U.S. at 840.
32. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
33. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. National Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985); see also
Table 1, infra. Justice Stevens' behavior seems to confirm this point. Early in the next Term, Justice Stevens
authored an opinion that was much more consistent with pre-Chevron case law than with the Chevron
doctrine. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524 (1985). And less than three
weeks before Chevron was decided, Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion stating that no deference
was due to an administrative interpretation because it "has not been a model of consistency." Aluminum
Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln People's Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380,402-03 n.3 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
These opinions tend to suggest that Justice Stevens himself regarded Chevron as a restatement of existing
law rather than a new approach.
34. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986).
As Judge Starr correctly notes: "This revolutionary effect is not apparent from a quick examination of the
opinion itself." Id. at 284.
35. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
36. Id. at 845.
37. Id. at 844.
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would have profound consequences for the way in which courts approach the
deference question. There are several reasons for reaching this conclusion.
First, in contrast to the previous approach, the two-step structure makes
deference an all-or-nothing matter. If the court resolves the question at step one,
then it exercises purely independent judgment and gives no consideration to the
executive view. If it resolves the question at step two, then it applies a standard
of maximum deference. In effect, Chevron transformed a regime that allowed
courts to give agencies deference along a sliding scale into a regime with an
on/off switch.
Second, the Court's new framework inverted the traditional default rule.
In the pre-Chevron period, deference to executive interpretations required
special justification; independent judgment was the default rule. Under Chevron,
the court must initially establish whether the issue is suitable for independent
judicial resolution; if it is not, the court automatically shifts into a deferential
mode. As aresult, independent judgment now requires special justification, and
deference is the default rule. If, as the Court seemed to suggest, the circum-
stances justifying independent judgment were defined narrowly, this inversion
portended a major transfer of interpretative power from courts to agencies.
Third, the two-step framework has important implications for the kinds of
considerations that enter into judicial decisionmaking. In particular, the frame-
work appears to exclude any examination of the multiple factors historically
relied upon by courts. The most immediate basis for this conclusion is the
Court's decision to defer to the EPA's definition of "stationary source" even
though it arguably represented a "sharp break with prior interpretations of the
Act."3 Thus, the decision appeared to downgrade the frequently cited factor
stressing th importance of agency views that were longstanding and consis-
tent.39 More importantly, none of the traditional factors fits under step one or
step two of the new framework. They are clearly irrelevant under step one,
which focuses entirely on what happened in Congress, not on the agency or its
decision. The factors could conceivably enter into the calculus at step two,
where the court asks if the executive interpretation is "reasonable." But by
"reasonable," the Court seemed to mean reasonable in light of the text, history,
and interpretative conventions that govern the interpretation of a statute by a
court; at least, this was the way the Court conducted the reasonableness inquiry
in Chevron and subsequent cases.4' The question whether an interpretation
38. Id. at 862.
39. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.
511, 517 (under Chevron, "there is no longer any justification for giving 'special' deference to 'long-
standing and consistent' agency interpretations of law"). On the other hand, Chevron itself made passing
reference to one traditional factor-agency expertise. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
40. 467 U.S. at 843-45.
41. See, e.g., Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., I11 S. Ct. 2524, 2534-35 (1991); Rust v. Sullivan,
111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
Two decisions from last Term illustrate the problem of what to do with the traditional factors under Chevron.
In Pauley, 111 S. Ct. 2524, the Court considered two traditional factors (expertise and longstanding and
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is reasonable in light of these traditional norms of judicial interpretation like-
wise provides no place for the various contextual factors that played such an
important role in the pre-Chevron era.
In addition to its novel framework, Chevron also broke new ground by
invoking democratic theory as a basis for requiring deference to executive
interpretations. Congress, Justice Stevens reasoned, is the ultimate source of
lawmaking authority in a democracy. "If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter;, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."42 If the intentions of the
primary lawgiver are not clear, however, then we are presented with a choice:
who should undertake to fill in the gap in the understanding of congressional
will, the court or the agency? Chevron declared that the agency is the preferred
gap filler. Judges "are not part of either political branch"; they "have no
constituency."'4 An agency, on the other hand, while "not directly accountable
to the people," is subject to the general oversight and supervision of the Presi-
dent, who is accountable. Thus, it is fitting that agencies, rather than courts,
resolve "the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.""
This new emphasis on democratic theory was important to the doctrinal
framework because it supplied the justification for switching the default rule
from independent judgment to deference. Under the pre-Chevron regime, not
every agency decision would qualify for deference in the face of an ambiguous
statute. In order to make deference a general default rule, the Court had to
come up with some universal reason why administrative interpretations should
be preferred to the judgments of Article III courts. Democratic theory supplied
the justification: agency decisionmaking is always more democratic than judicial
consistent interpretation) as part of the discussion of whether or not to defer. In Rust, 111 S. Ct. 1759, on
the other hand, the Court appended a discussion of traditional factors (lack of consistency in the agency
position and the well-reasoned nature of the decision) to its discussion under step two. These recent decisions
indicate that the Court continues to believe the traditional factors are relevant, but has no idea what to do
with them under the Chevron framework.
42. 467 U.S. at 842-43.
43. Id. at 865-66.
44. Id. For a recent elaboration of the democratic theory foundations of Chevron, see Laurence H.
Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 822-24 (1990).
Chevron's democratic theory thesis appears to presuppose a unitary executive, i.e., an interpretation of
separation of powers that would place all entities engaged in the execution of the law-including the so-
called independent regulatory agencies-under Presidential control. See Steven Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes,
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr.
1992); Geoffrey Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Cr. REV. 41. Agencies are not directly accountable
to the people; they can invoke a popular mandate only if they are accountable to the elected President.
Although the unitary executive construction was dealt a setback in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(permitting Congress to insulate independent counsel from removal except for good cause), it is far from
clear that the matter has been settled conclusively. See Touby v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1752, 1757 (1991)
(noting that "[tihe Constitution vests all executive power in the President, U.S. Const., Art. 11, § 1").
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decisionmaking because all agencies are accountable (to some degree) to the
President, and the President is elected by the people.
Chevron's heavy reliance on democratic theory left one major problem.
Congress presumably ranks higher on the democracy scale than do the agencies.
After all, Congress is directly elected by the people; agencies are at most
indirectly accountable to the electorate through the President. Yet how do we
know that Congress, the ultimate democratic trump card, wants ambiguities and
gaps to be resolved by agencies rather than by courts?
Chevron solved this potential quandary by adopting its third and probably
most controversial innovation: a presumption that whenever Congress has
delegated authority to an agency to administer a statute, it has also delegated
authority to the agency to interpret any ambiguities present in the statute.45
Previous cases, as we have seen, suggested that deference was appropriate if
Congress had expressly delegated to an executive agency the power to define
a particular term. Chevron in effect adopted a fiction that assimilated all cases
involving statutory ambiguities or gaps into the express delegation or "legisla-
tive rule" model.46
In short, the Chevron opinion can be understood as a prescription for
resolving questions of statutory interpretation through a series of presumptions
about primary and delegated lawmaking. Congress is presumed to be the
primary lawmaking institution, and where it has spoken, its will must prevail.
But when Congress has not addressed the precise issue in dispute and has
delegated authority to an administrative agency, then we presume that interpre-
tative authority has been delegated to the agency. Only if Congress is silent and
has failed to designate an agency to administer the statute do we presume that
power to interpret ambiguous law has been delegated to an Article III court.
Given the rhetoric of Justice Stevens' opinion, the most apparent objective
of this series of presumptions was to maximize the role of democratically
accountable institutions in the process of legal interpretation and to restrict the
discretion of unelected courts. Conceivably, the formalism of Chevron may also
45. In Chevron, the Court stated the presumption in terms of "implicit" delegations:
'The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created ... program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.' If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation.... Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather than explicit.
467 U.S. at 843-44 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
Recent decisions have reaffirmed that the general duty to defer identified in Chevron is grounded in
a theory of presumed delegation. See Pauley, 111 S. Ct. at 2534; Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm., I IlS. Ct. 1171, 1175 (1991) (discussing deference to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 110 S. Ct. 1384 (1990). For an especially clear recognition that
Chevron rests on a presumption that ambiguities entail a delegation of interpretative power, see Scalia, supra
note 39, at 516-17.
46. See Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal
for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 357 (Chevron appears to eliminate the distinction between
legislative rules and intepretative rules).
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have reflected a desire to streamline the deference inquiry by reducing the
multiple variables of the preceding era to two basic inquiries. In any event, in
the clarity of its procedural formula, and the implications of that formula for
the balance of power among the branches, Chevron does indeed appear to
presage a "revolutionary" transformation of the old order.
II. CHEVRON: THE REVOLUTION IN PRACTICE
Each year the Supreme Court decides somewhere between ten and twenty
cases in which it confronts an issue about whether to defer to an administrative
interpretation of a statute. This steady stream of deference cases has abated only
slightly since Chevron was decided. As a result, there is now an extensive body
of decisional law within the Court that can be used to gauge Chevron's impact.
Surprisingly, no one has undertaken a comprehensive survey of these deci-
sions.47 To the contrary, the commentary on Chevron tends to assume-almost
always based on only a handful of the Court's post-Chevron decisions-either
that the Court has faithfully followed Chevron in succeeding years4" or that
the Court has essentially disregarded the radical implications of the decision.4 9
A survey of the full range of the Court's decisions before and after Chevron
discloses a more complex and indeed rather bewildering picture. On the one
hand, Chevron clearly has resulted in a significant shift in the deference
doctrine. On the other hand, Chevron has not produced anything like a complete
revolution in the Court's jurisprudence. On the whole, the overall picture
suggests that the judicial understanding that informs the deference question is
probably more confused today than it has ever been.
A. The Incomplete Revolution
One way to measure the impact of Chevron is to examine the Court's own
post-Chevron deference cases in the aggregate. In order to make such an
assessment, I reviewed all Supreme Court decisions from the 1981 Term to the
end of the 1990 Term. The results for the seven post-Chevron Terms (Chevron
was decided near the end of the 1983 Term) are summarized in Table 1.5°
47. The most complete account of post-Chevron developments in the Supreme Court is found in
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2091-104.
48. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpreta-
tions of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 302 (1988); Starr, supra note 34, at 291.
49. See, e.g., Linda R. Hirschman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative
Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 646, 703 (1988).
50. The cases that comprise the data are summarized in the tables, infra pp. 981-82, 992, and are listed
in the Appendix, infra.
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TABLE 1. Post-Chevron Terms
A B C D E F
TOTAL CASES CHEVRON CHEVRON
INVOLVING CHEVRON FRAMEWORK: FRAMEWORK: CASES CITNG
DEENCE AECY VIEw FAmEwoRK AGENCY ViW DECIDED AT TRADmONAL
TERM QUESION ACCEPTED APPLIED ACCE'TED SrEP TWO FACrORS
1990 11 8 (73%) 6 (55%) 4 (66%) 2 (33%) 6 (55%)
1989 14 8 (57%) 9 (62%) 4 (44%) 2 (25%) 4 (29%)
1988 9 4 (44%) 3 (33%) 1 (33%) 1 (33%) 6 (66%)
1987 14 9 (64%) 5 (36%) 3 (60%) 3 (50%) 3 (21%)
1986 9 5 (55%) 2 (22%) 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 2 (22%)
1985 14 11(78%) 6 (43%) 5 (83%) 4 (66%) 6 (43%)
1984 19 18 (94%) 1 (5%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 7 (35%)
TOTAL 1984-90 90 63 (70%) 32 (36%) 19 (59%) 14 (44%) 34 (37%)
Column A reports the total number of cases each Term in which at least
one Justice recognized the presence of a question (concerning either a primary
or a subsidiary issue) about whether to give deference to an administrative
interpretation of a statute.5' Column B indicates how many of these decisions
accepted the executive interpretation.52 Column C shows how many of the
total cases applied the two-step Chevron framework or its equivalent;5 3 column
51. Adopting a principle for including cases in the survey posed some problems. On the one hand, it
is commonly perceived that there are many cases in which the Court substitutes its judgment for that of
the agency and fails even to mention the possibility of deference. See 5 DAVIS, supra note 6, at 403. Ideally,
these cases would be included in the sample in order to determine the true incidence of deference. On the
other hand, it would be very difficult to determine all the cases in which the Court could have deferred.
I would have had to read the briefs and records in all cases involving a question of federal statutory
interpretation. Moreover, determining the full set of potential deference cases based on some independent
standard would pose difficult conceptual problems in defining what is a potential deference case. For
instance, would a decision count as a potential deference case if it involved an interpretation adopted for
the first time in briefs filed in court defending an agency action? Would a decision count as a potential
deference case if it involved an interpretation of a provision that the agency is not directly empowered to
regulate? Given these competing considerations, I compromised and adopted a selection principle that
included all cases in which at least one Justice mentioned the possibility of deferring to an agency
interpretation. This picks up some of the cases where the majority substitutes judgment and does not mention
deference, but a dissenting or concurring Justice raises the issue. Thus, it produces a slightly larger sample
than would an approach that looked solely to majority opinions. But clearly the one-Justice principle does
not include all potential deference cases (for example, it skips cases where the Court is unanimous and
substitutes its judgment). Consequently, the sample still undercounts the total number of cases where
deference could have been invoked.
Another problem was what to do with cases that present slight variations on the question of deference
to agency interpretations of statutes, such as cases involving an agency interpretation of its own regulations,
agency interpretations of a treaty, or challenges to agency policies on the ground that they were adopted
in an arbitrary and capricious manner (as opposed to being in conflict with a statute). These cases (which
were relatively few in number compared to the statutory interpretation cases) were excluded in the interest
of minimizing complexity.
52. "Accepting the agency interpretation" is not the same as ruling in favor of the government. In a
few cases the Court ruled against the government even though it accepted the agency interpretation. This
might happen, for example, if the Solicitor General disclaimed the agency view, but the Court agreed with
it. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
53. I adopted a very broad test for determining whether the Court was "applying" the Chevron
framework. I included in this category not just the cases that quoted the two-step procedure, or organized
the discussion around the two-step procedure, but also those that cited Chevron or post-Chevron decisions,
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D reports how many of the cases following the Chevron framework accepted
the executive interpretation; column E reveals the number of Chevron cases that
gave some consideration to the reasonableness of the executive view (step two
of the framework) as opposed to stopping at step one. Finally, column F
indicates how many controlling opinions in the cases rely on one or more of
the traditional factors applied in the pre-Chevron period, such as longstanding
and consistent interpretation, contemporaneous interpretation, congressional
ratification, and so forth.M In order to provide a basis for comparison, Table
2 reproduces data for some of these variables (total deference cases, cases
accepting the administrative interpretation, and cases applying traditional
factors) for the three pre-Chevron Terms, 1981-83.
TABLE 2. Pre-Chevron Terms
A B F
TOTAL CASES INVOLVING CASES CITING
TERM DEPERERCE QUESTION AGENCY VIEW ACCEPTED TRADITIONAL FACTORS
1983 19 13 (68%) 11(57%)
1982 15 11(73%) 11(73%)
1981 11 10 (90%) 8 (73%)
TOTAL 1981-83 45 34 (75%) 30 (66%)
A number of interesting conclusions can be derived from the figures in
Tables 1 and 2. First, it is clear that Chevron is often ignored by the Supreme
Court. Although the Chevron opinion purports to describe a universal standard
by which to determine whether to follow an administrative interpretation of a
statute, the two-step framework has been used in only about one-third of the
total post-Chevron cases in which one or more Justices recognized that a
deference question was presented.55 Although Chevron began to be used more
frequently after the 1987 Term, it is still far from the monolithic norm the
such as K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), in setting forth the standard of review, or that
otherwise indicated that deference would be owed to any agency decision provided Congress had not clearly
answered the question. Essentially, I tried to determine whether the author of the controlling opinion was
thinking about Chevron in setting forth the analysis of deference. Although admittedly this is a highly
subjective standard, I believe it is more reliable than any other yardstick. If anything, it tends to overstate
the influence of Chevron.
54. Column F includes both Chevron framework cases and non-Chevron framework cases. Most of
the cases in this column either ignore or disclaim reliance on Chevron in favor of the traditional approach.
Some, however, purport to rely on the Chevron framework, even if this is (arguably) inconsistent with also
relying on the traditional factors.
55. This undoubtedly understates the extent to which Chevron is ignored, because cases where there
is an executive interpretation, but where the Court fails to note even the possibility of deferring to that
interpretation, were excluded from the survey. In other words, the most extreme instances of "independent
judgment" were ignored. See supra note 51.
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opinion seems to describe. If we look solely at the 1987-90 period, the two-step
framework was still applied in only half of the deference decisions.
Although some of the failure to rely on Chevron may be attributed to time
lag, as awareness of the decision slowly disseminated through the administrative
bar,56 this cannot account for the persistent resistance to using the framework
in the Supreme Court. By the end of the 1987 Term, for example, the Court
had applied the Chevron framework in fifteen different cases in a wide variety
of areas.57 Any Justice who was paying attention to the Court's own work
product should have been thoroughly versed in the tenets of Chevron by this
time. Moreover, even if administrative lawyers in specialized areas like tax and
labor law were late in coming to an awareness of Chevron, the federal agencies
were represented in the Supreme Court almost exclusively by the Solicitor
General's office-a small group of "generalists" who have been very conscious
of Chevron.58 Thus, by 1987 at the latest, the agencies could be expected to
take maximum advantage of Chevron in the Supreme Court. Yet in the 1988-90
Terms, the Court continued to apply the Chevron framework in only half the
cases presenting a deference question. The persistent spottiness of Chevron
during this period strongly suggests that the Court in many cases was simply
56. The survey clearly suggests such a time lag. As previously noted, it took sometime for the Chevron
doctrine to appear in the Court's opinions; the 1984 Term must for all intents and purposes be considered
part of the pre-Chevron era. Moreover, even in years when Chevron is applied with some frequency, it tends
to be invoked less often in areas where there is a particularly rich tradition of pre-Chevron precedent on
deference. For example, in Title VII, labor, tax, social security, and environmental cases, the Court (no doubt
guided to a degree by the submissions of the parties) still tends to frame the deference standard in the terms
expressed in earlier decisions specific to these areas, rather than in terms of Chevron. See, e.g., Cottage Sav.
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991) (citing previous cases for deference standard; no mention
of Chevron); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1235 (1991) (citing pre-Chevron cases for
standard of deference to EEOC); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989)
(Council on Environmental Quality's interpretation of NEPA assessed under traditional factors, no citation
to Chevron); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154 (1986) (review of Social Security Administration interpretation
based on legislative/interpretative distinction of pre-Chevron era); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57,65 (1986) (same); NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc., 469 U.S. 490,494-96 (1984) (citing Packard Motor
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), and NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 332 U.S. 111 (1944) (defer-
ence approach to NLRB decisions).
In contrast, in areas in which the pre-Chevron case law was less well developed-ERISA and banking
cases seem to fall in this category--Chevron seems to have made more headway in the Court. See, e.g.,
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2668, 2676 (1990) (applying Chevron standard in
ERISA controversy); Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714 (1989) (same); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n,
479 U.S. 388 (1987) (Chevron applied to interpretation by Comptroller of Currency); Board of Governors
v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986) (Chevron framework applied to Federal Reserve interpreta-
tion).
57. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988); Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S.
399 (1988); ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495 (1988); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988);
NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112 (1987); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); United States Dep't of Transp. v.
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986); Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986);
United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657 (1986); Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
U.S. 361 (1986); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Chemical Mfrs.
Ass'n v. National Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
58. This was true by the fall of 1987, when I joined the Solicitor General's Office.
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not prepared to abide by the type of analysis dictated by Chevron-although
apparently it was not prepared to abandon it or explain why it ought not to be
controlling either.
Second, although Chevron is generally regarded as directing that courts give
greater deference to executive interpretations, there is no discernible relationship
between the application of the Chevron framework and greater acceptance of
the executive view. Indeed, cases applying the Chevron approach have on the
whole producedfewer affirmances of executive interpretations than those that
do not follow Chevron. 9 Although the number of cases is too small to attrib-
ute significance to the precise percentages, the general phenomenon is apparent
when we compare the rate of acceptances in the cases actually applying the
Chevron framework in the post-Chevron period-59% adopting the agency
view-with either the overall acceptance rate in the post-Chevron period (70%)
or the rate in the pre-Chevron era (75%). Paradoxically, it appears that adoption
of the Chevron framework has meant, if anything, a decline in deference to
agency views.
The suggestion that Chevron has had little discernible influence on the
Supreme Court contrasts sharply with the only other published empirical study
of Chevron's impact. Professors Peter Schuck and Donald Elliot undertook a
survey of Chevron's influence on lower courts and found that deference to
agency interpretations increased sharply after Chevron.60 Their findings, how-
ever, are not necessarily inconsistent with my data suggesting no such change
in the Supreme Court. Lower courts probably take Supreme Court opinions
more seriously than does the Court itself.61 Moreover, one would predict that
as it became increasingly evident over time that the Supreme Court employs
the Chevron approach only sporadically, lower courts would begin to revert to
their old habits. And indeed, there is evidence in the Schuck and Elliot study
that suggests the "Chevron effect" in the lower courts may have been only
temporary.
6 2
Third, the tables indicate that the emergence of Chevron has caused a
decline in reliance on the traditional contextual factors for determining whether
59. This conclusion is to some extent probably a reflection of my sampling methodology. In particular,
the non-Chevron cases may contain a disproportionate number of affirmances. This is because when the
Court agrees with an agency construction, it may often throw in deference to the administrative agency as
an additional factor or consideration in support of its judgment. But when it disagrees with the agency view,
it may not mention the issue of deference. On the other hand, this possibility is mitigated by the fact that
even if the majority ignores the agency interpretation, a dissenting or concurring opinion may raise the issue
of deference-and these cases are also included in the sample. Moreover, even if the rate of agency
affirmances is overstated in the non-Chevron cases, this would not account for the relatively low percentage
of affirmances in the cases applying the Chevron framework, where the issue of deference is necessarily
presented in each instance.
60. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984.
61. Indeed, they are required to do so in many circumstances. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
343-45 (1975) (lower courts bound by Supreme Court summary affirmance, even if Court itself is not).
62. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 60, at 1037.
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deference is appropriate. Again, the numbers are too small to attribute signifi-
cance to precise percentages, but in the pre-Chevron period (1981-83 Terms)
66% of the deference cases cited one or more of these traditional factors. In
the post-Chevron period, in contrast, the percentage of cases citing one of these
factors declined to 36% overall. Still, it is obvious that the Court's invocation
of these factors persists, with no visible trend pointing toward their complete
extinction. This is not what one would expect to find if Chevron had completely
transformed the practice of deciding when to defer.
B. The Contested Revolution
When we turn from the aggregate data to an examination of the Court's
opinions, the picture that emerges again suggests that the Chevron revolu-
tion-although real-is a tenuous one. I will not discuss the many routine
applications of Chevron, the even more numerous cases that ignore Chevron,
or even those cases where the majority and dissent disagree over the proper
application of Chevron to particular circumstances. More revealing are the
opinions that engage in disputes over what might be called "Chevron fundamen-
tals." The presence of these disputes is not necessarily surprising. There has
probably never been a watershed Supreme Court opinion (consider Brown,
Miranda, Mapp, and Roe)63 that did not generate subsequent controversy over
the scope and meaning of the original decision. What is striking, however, is
the extent to which the Court's resolutions of disputes over the meaning of the
Chevron framework rest uncomfortably with the rationale of the original
decision.
Without a doubt, the most remarkable episode occurred in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,6 a case involving interpretation of immigration law, where
the Court has traditionally shown considerable deference to executive views.
65
Specifically, the issue was whether the statutory standard for awarding asylum
could be construed as requiring the same showing of likelihood of persecution
upon return to the country of origin as the standard for withholding of deporta-
tion. The Attorney General, acting through the Bureau of Immigration Appeals,
determined that the two provisions required the same showing. A bare majority
of five Justices-in an opinion by Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron-held
that this executive interpretation was not entitled to deference. The first reason
was entirely consistent with the Chevron framework: "Employing traditional
tools of statutory construction, we have concluded that Congress did not intend
63. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
65. See, e.g., INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 452 (1985) (admonishing lower courts not to usurp
authority granted to the Attorney General in administering the immigration laws); Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101-02 n.21 (1976) (noting that "power over aliens is of a political character and
therefore subject to only a narrow judicial review").
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the two standards to be identical."66 In what appeared to be an alternative
holding, however, Justice Stevens stated that the Chevron standard was in any
event inapplicable because the issue for decision was a "pure question of
statutory construction."'67 Deference would be appropriate, he suggested, only
if the case concerned the application of the standard to particular facts.68
The notion that deference to agency views should turn on the distinction
between pure questions of law and questions of law application can be found
in some Supreme Court decisions of the 1940's.69 But the distinction had been
abandoned for all practical purposes long before Chevron was decided.70 The
suggestion that what Chevron had done was to restore this ancient learning was
truly astonishing, as Justice Scalia made clear in an acidic concurrence. In fact,
as Justice Scalia correctly noted, the issue in Chevron, concerning the proper
definition of the statutory term "source," was obviously a "pure question of
law," and hence would be entitled to no deference under the Court's distinc-
tion.71 Moreover, the dispute about the proper meaning of Chevron had not
been briefed and argued in Cardoza-Fonseca, nor was it necessary to the
decision. It was thus inappropriate for the Court to cast doubt on such "an
extremely important and frequently cited opinion."72
Cardoza-Fonseca gave rise to a brief period of uncertainty in the lower
courts over whether Chevron still applied to pure questions of law.73 By the
end of the next Term, however, the Court was again applying the Chevron
doctrine (irregularly, as ever) to questions of law, and Cardoza-Fonseca quietly
dropped from sight.74 But if Cardoza-Fonseca had no lasting impact on the
66. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 448.
69. Compare Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947) (no deference to agency
views on "naked question of law") with NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944)
(great deference to NLRB's determination of how statutory standard applied to particular factual circum-
stances).
70. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981)
(deferring to agency interpretation of pure question of law); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S.
555 (1980) (same); Monaghan, supra note 6, at 29-30.
71. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 455 (Scalia, L, concurring in judgment).
72. Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
73. See NLRB v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 834 F.2d 191, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (under Cardoza--
Fonseca no deference due to agency interpretation of"pure question of law"); Union of Concerned Scientists
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Cardoza-Fonseca
"strongly indicate[s] that courts are to apply the Chevron test only in circumstances in which an agency
is required to apply a legal standard to a particular set of facts"). But see NLRB v. FLRA, 834 F.2d at 202
(Starr, L, concurring) ("I continue to believe that Chevron's two-step interpretative process, which was
reaffirmed in Cardoza-Fonseca, provides the polestar that is to guide us."); id. at 203 (D. Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (sharing Judge Starr's belief).
74. Early in the next term, Justice Scalia stated in a concurring opinion, NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 23,484 U.S. 112, 133-34 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring), that Cardoza-
Fonseca was not being followed by the Court (although the majority in that case cited both Chevron and
Cardoza-Fonseca). Shortly thereafter, the Court reverted to the Chevron framework without any suggestion
that it was confined to cases of law application. See Mead Corp. v. Tilly, 490 U.S. 714 (1989); Pittston Coal
Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988); K Mart Corp v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
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Court's understanding of the Chevron doctrine, the episode nevertheless sug-
gests that the Court's commitment to Chevron-at least in its unvarnished
original form-was at best fragile. The fact that a majority of the Court was
prepared (if only temporarily) to recast that doctrine in a way that would strip
it of most of its significance hardly suggests that the Court was comfortable
with Chevron's innovations.
Other disputes over Chevron fundamentals soon followed. Although less
dramatic than Cardoza-Fonseca, on balance they too suggested that the Court
was not prepared to accept the full implications of the decision.
With respect to one issue-what type of agency decision is entitled to
Chevron deference-the Court has been faithful to Chevron's logic. In Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett,75 the Court held that Chevron applies only to agency
decisions that are an exercise of delegated authority. Thus, a statement by the
Department of Labor about the scope of private judicial remedies available
under a federal statute was entitled to no deference because the agency was
given no authority to regulate this matter. Although this decision cuts back on
the potential scope of the Chevron doctrine, it is consistent with the language
and rationale of Chevron, with its focus on the delegation of interpretative
authority implicit in the delegation of decisional authority.
With respect to other issues, however, the Court has departed from
Chevron's logic. For example, the Court has held that Chevron deference does
not apply to legal interpretations advanced for the first time in appellate briefs
filed on behalf of an agency.76 This conclusion is consistent with established
tenets of administrative law.77 But unlike the proposition recognized in Adams
Fruit, a general "post hoc rationalization of counsel" exception is not consistent
with Chevron. If Congress has delegated authority to an agency to enforce a
particular statute, and therefore (per Chevron) has impliedly delegated inferpre-
tative authority to the agency, it should not matter if the agency announces its
interpretation through a brief as opposed to, for example, an opinion letter
written by the general counsel or an informal adjudication (both of which have
been held to be entitled to Chevron deference78). Indeed, Justice Scalia has
recognized in a law review article that the "post hoc rationalization" of counsel
exception is at odds with Chevron.9 Whatever the implications of Chevron
75. 494 U.S. 638 (1990). The holding in Adams Fruit was foreshadowed by Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168-84 (1990), where he argued that legal opinions of
the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice were not entitled to Chevron deference because
they dealt with matters over which that office had no enforcement responsibility.
76. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988).
77. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1978); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628
(1971); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
78. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2668 (1990) (Chevron deference to prior
opinion letters); Mead Corp. v. Tlley, 490 U.S. 714 (1989) (same); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (Chevron deference to Commerce Department certification of national
compliance with treaty obligations); Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986) (Chevron
deference to FDA notices setting "tolerance levels").
79. Scalia, supra note 39, at 517-18.
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might be for this issue, however, it is clear that the Court is not about to start
deferring to government legal briefs.
Another issue that has resulted in a potentially important qualification of
the Chevron framework concerns the status of canons of statutory construction.
Chevron itself does not mention canons, and it is unclear where they fit under
the framework. Although the canons clearly qualify as a "traditional too[l] of
statutory construction,""0 it is odd to think of a court concluding on the basis
of a canon that Congress had an intention "on the precise question at issue."
Canons are maxims or rules of thumb that allow courts to impute answers to
interpretative questions when it is not possible to discern by more direct means
what the legislature intended. Thus, one would expect that if a court could
interpret a statute only by invoking a canon, it would be forced to acknowledge
that the issue is one to which Congress has not clearly spoken and that, under
Chevron, it must therefore defer to a reasonable interpretation by the adminis-
trative agency. Conceivably, the court would consider the canons at step two,
in asking whether the agency interpretation is reasonable.81 But again, if an
agency interpretation is consistent with the language and purpose of a statute,
it is hard to see how it could be condemned as unreasonable simply because
a judicial canon would suggest a contrary result.
The Court first directly confronted the issue of canons and Chevron in
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction
Trades Council.2 The Court acknowledged that the relevant provision of the
National Labor Relations Act was ambiguous and that the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) had interpreted the provision to prohibit certain types
of handbilling. But the Court also thought the NLRB's construction would raise
serious constitutional questions. Relying on the canon of avoiding interpreta-
tions that raise serious constitutional questions, 3 the Court in effect held that
the result suggested by Chevron was trumped by the result suggested by the
canon. Thus, instead of integrating the canon into step one-on the ground that
it was indicative of congressional intent-or step two-on the ground that it
illuminated the question of reasonableness-the Court used the canon to oust
the Chevron framework altogether.
The implications of this decision for the future of Chevron are hard to
assess. On the one hand, DeBartolo could mean that Chevron itself is just
another canon, as Professor Cass Sunstein has argued.' If true, this would
raise a whole host of unanswered-and probably unanswerable-questions
about which canons override Chevron and which are subordinate to Chevron.
80. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
81. Cf. Note, Chevron and Canons of Statutory Construction, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829 (1990)
(arguing that "statute defining" canons should apply at step one while "statute applying" canons should
apply at step two).
82. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
83. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
84. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2113.
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On the other hand, in Rust v. Sullivan,85 the Court applied Chevron and re-
fused to follow DeBartolo in circumstances where three Justices found that the
agency interpretation was unconstitutional, 6 thus establishing that it raised
"serious constitutional doubts." Rust could mean that DeBartolo will be con-
fined to its facts.87 In any event, in holding that at least one canon trumps
Chevron on at least one occasion, the Court has further called into doubt its
commitment to the strictures of the Chevron doctrine."8
A third development concerns agency interpretations that are at odds with
prior judicial precedent. Chevron holds that statutory ambiguities are to be
resolved, if possible, by agencies not courts. Thus, if a court has construed an
ambiguous statute one way (without the benefit of an agency view), and an
agency later has occasion to read the statute differently, the logic of Chevron
would seem to indicate that the court should follow the agency interpretation,
rather than the earlier judicial pronouncement. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit in
Chevron had invalidated the EPA's interpretation of "stationary source" largely
because it was contrary to prior D.C. Circuit precedent, and the Court held that
this did not justify a departure from deference. 89
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in Maislin Industries, U.S. v. Primary
Steel, Inc.,9° emphatically rejected the idea that an agency might disregard a
previous judicial construction of a statute, at least when it is a precedent of the
Supreme Court: "Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we
adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge
an agency's later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination
of the statute's meaning." 91 It is difficult to quarrel with this conclusion, for
there would be something unsettling about a world in which executive branch
administrators could "overrule" Supreme Court decisions. Again, however, the
85. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
86. See id. at 1780-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.).
87. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority was less than illuminating on the question of
why the constitutional issues did not raise a"serious question." He simply stated that petitioners' constitu-
tional arguments, although "not without some force," were not enough to "carry the day." Id. at 1771. The
opinion arguably can be read as limiting the DeBartolo canon to cases in which the agency interpretation
would be unconstitutional, as opposed to merely raising a "serious question" of constitutionality.
88. Other cases have presented questions involving the interaction of Chevron and the canons, but have
not shed much light on the issue. In EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991), the Court
relied heavily on the canon that statutes are presumed not to apply outside the territorial limits of the United
States, and refused to defer to the contrary judgment of the EEOC. But the Court did not apply the Chevron
framework, so the decision does not say anything about the relationship between Chevron and the canons.
In Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd,
493 U.S. 38 (1989), the D.C. Circuit reasoned that Chevron supersedes canons based on substantive policy
considerations, such as the canon requiring that exceptions to the antitrust laws be narrowly construed. The
Court granted certiorari but affirmed by an equally divided vote, and thus wrote no opinion.
89. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 841-42 (1984); see
also Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1129-31 (9th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (interpreting Chevron to permit agency to change interpretation notwithstanding Supreme
Court affirmance of prior view).
90. 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).
91. Id. at 2768.
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outcome does not follow from the logic of Chevron and must be counted as
yet another qualification on that doctrine.
In short, the post-Chevron decisions explicating the meaning of Chevron
reveal much that calls into question the Court's fidelity to the doctrine. In one
instance--Cardoza-Fonseca-the Court adopted, albeit only temporarily, an
exception that would swallow the rule. Other decisions reveal a pattern of
qualifying or compromising the doctrine with other principles suggesting that
Chevron rests at best uneasily in the larger body of administrative law.
C. The Revolution Transformed
Perhaps the most significant post-Chevron development, however, is a
subtle but important modification in the statement of the relevant inquiry at step
one. As we have seen, Chevron formulated that inquiry in terms of whether the
court could "clearly" discern that Congress "had an intention on the precise
question at issue."92 If this threshold requirement were faithfully followed,
there is little doubt that it would mark a major shift of interpretative power
toward the executive branch: it is a rare case where a court can fairly say that
Congress thought about, let alone formulated a clear view on, the precise issue
in controversy. The "specific intentions" formulation therefore operates as an
engine of judicial deference. By the same token, however, if the threshold
determination for independent judicial resolution at step one were described
differently-for example, if courts were instructed to ask whether the statute
has a general meaning that resolves the controversy, even if Congress has not
specifically addressed the issue at hand-then the balance might shift back
toward independent judgment. In short, under the two-step Chevron framework,
everything turns on the theory of judicial interpretation adopted at step one.93
Post-Chevron cases have in fact begun to change the formulation of the
step-one inquiry. The first sign of change was when opinions began to drop any
reference to "specific intentions" or whether Congress had "clearly spoken to"
the issue at hand and instead described the threshold inquiry simply in terms
of whether the statute was "ambiguous" or "unclear.'' 94 Then, beginning in
1988 with the K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc decision,95 a more dramatic change
emerged: the Court began to describe the inquiry at step one in terms of
whether the statute has a "plain meaning." 96 This rubric, an offspring of the
92. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
93. See Anthony, supra note 7, at 18-25.
94. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., I1l S.
Ct. 615 (1991); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988);
Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
95. 486 U.S. 281 (1988). The K Mart approach was anticipated in Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen,
485 U.S. 399 (1988), Justice Kennedy's first opinion for the Court.
96. See, e.g., Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S. Ct. 599 (1991) (offering no deference to administrative
construction that is contrary to plain language of statute); Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990)
(upholding agency interpretation as being compelled by plain meaning of statute); Public Employees
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"'new textualism" espoused more generally by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, 97
has not been followed uniformly. Some opinions continue to quote the language
of Chevron about whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at
issue.98 The trend, however, has been strongly away from the original Chevron
formulation of step one.
What are the consequences of substituting textualism for intentionalism at
step one? By itself, such a shift does not necessarily reduce deference. Indeed,
if the inquiry at step one is formulated in terms of whether the statutory text
discloses that Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue, this results
in even greater deference to agency views, because Congress has undoubtedly
"spoken to" fewer issues in text than it has through some combination of
textual and nontextual sources. But at the same time that the Court has dropped
the language of intent and substituted the language of plain meaning, it has also
dropped the reference to "the precise question at issue." In K Mart, for exam-
ple, Justice Kennedy's opinion stated that in ascertaining whether there is a
plain meaning, "the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue,
as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole." 99 In this fash-
ion, the "plain meaning" inquiry has tended in practice to devolve into an
inquiry about whether the statute as a whole generates a clearly preferred
meaning.'t°
The movement from "specific intention" to "plain meaning" to "plain
meaning considering the design of the statute as a whole" is but one short step
away from "best meaning." In other words, with a shift at step one from the
"specific intentions" rubric to the "plain meaning" rubric, the Court has moved
the threshold inquiry a long way toward the exercise of independent judgment.
Justice Scalia has candidly admitted that the use of textualism at step one has
this consequence:
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby
finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference
exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept
an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally
adopt. Contrariwise, one who abhors a "plain meaning" rule, and is
willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached
Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989) ('Nlo deference is due to agency interpretations at odds
with the plain language of the statute itself.").
97. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); Patricia
M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term
of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 281 (1990).
98. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2668 (1990); Mead Corp. v. Tilley,
490 U.S. 714 (1989).
99. 486 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added). Four Justices joined this portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion,
making it the opinion of the Court.
100. For examples of this trend, see Dole v. United Steelworkers, 110 S. Ct. 929 (1990); Sullivan v.
Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990); Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
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by the legislative history, will more frequently find agency-liberating
ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range of "reasonable"
interpretation that the agency may adopt and to which the courts must
pay deference. The frequency with which Chevron will require that
judge to accept an interpretation he thinks wrong is infinitely great-
er.10
1
In short, the merger of the two-step Chevron framework and Justice Scalia's
"plain meaning" approach to statutory construction, if consistently followed,
would dramatically transform Chevron from a deference doctrine to a doctrine
of antideference.
Table 3, which collects the results from Table 1 into two time periods,
suggests that the K Mart reformulation may mark the beginning of such a
transformation. The first period spans the 1985 and 1986 Terms. Chevron was
reasonably well established by this time; it had been expressly reaffirmed in
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. National Resources Defense Council'°2 in
the previous year, and had not yet encountered any significant controversy. The
second period covers the 1988 to 1990 Terms-after the Cardoza-Fonseca
episode and after the plain meaning reformulation of step one in K Mart. Table
3 indicates that the Chevron framework was used more frequently in the second
period than in the first (going from 32% of deference cases to 52%). This is
perhaps what one would expect, given the prominence accorded Chevron by
the controversies that erupted in Cardoza-Fonseca and other cases. However,
the rate of acceptance of the agency construction went down between the two
periods (from 66% to 50%), as indeed did the acceptance rate in all deference
cases (from 72% to 59%).
TABLE 3. Post-Chevron Terms in Two Periods
A B C D H F
TOTAL CASMS CHEVRON CHEVRON
INVOLVING CHEVRON FRANEWOiv : FkAMEWORK: CAsES CMNO
DEPERENCE AGENCY VIEw FRAMEWORK AGENCY ViEW DEaDED AT TRADIIONAL
TIRM QUESTION ACCEIED APPIED ACCEPTED STEP TWO FACTORS
1988-90 34 20 (59%) 18 (51%) 9 (50%) 5 (30%) 16 (47%)
1985-86 25 18 (72%) 8 (32%) 6 (66%) 5 (62%) 8 (35%)
101. Scalia, supra note 39, at 521. Note that Justice Scalia's explanation for why textualism would
result in less deference is quite different from mine. He seems to believe that textualism leads to determinate
results in most cases and that introducing evidence of intent to "impeach" the text muddles things up and
thus requires deference. My argument is that textualism will answer the 'precise question" at issue in so
few cases that it leads courts to abandon the quest for specific congressional answers, thus allowing a
dramatically expanded judicial role at step one.
102. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
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Again, the shift is produced by changes in only a handful of cases, and the
precise percentages are not that meaningful. But it is possible that what we are
seeing here is at least caused in part by the emergence of the new plain mean-
ing approach to step one associated with K Mart. Some confirmation of this
is supplied by the number of cases reaching step two of the Chevron frame-
work. The more expansive the theory of the judicial role is at step one, the
fewer occasions there are to move on to step two. Although the Court has not
given much consideration to step two at any time throughout the post-Chevron
period, it is interesting to note that the frequency declined even further between
the earlier and later periods.
III. WHAT'S WRONG wrrH CHEVRON?
Chevron's adoption of a general theoretical framework for structuring the
choice between independent judgment and deference was an important advance
over the formlessness of the previous era. Unfortunately, evidence is mounting
that the Court picked the wrong framework. I have already described the
primary symptom of dysfunction: the lack of congruence between Chevron and
the actual practice of the Supreme Court in determining whether or to what
extent to defer to administrative interpretations of statutes. Theory and practice
diverge in many ways: the failure to apply Chevron in at least half the cases
in which, by its own terms, it should govern; the continuing use of traditional
factors of deference which Chevron appears to render irrelevant; the creation
of numerous exceptions to Chevron that do not seem to cohere with the deci-
sion's rationale; the development of a different version of the Chevron doctrine
that greatly expands the judicial role at step one.
It is possible to argue that these manifold deviations simply reflect lapses
ofjudgment on the part of the Court, and that the proper response is to identify
the "true" version of Chevron and exhort the Justices to follow it consistently.
But the divergences between theory and practice canvassed in Part II are so
pervasive that it is difficult to attribute the problem simply to judicial backslid-
ing. Supreme Court Justices are practical individuals, sensitive to the traditions
of American constitutionalism, and the Court's persistent refusal to abide by
the narrow strictures of Chevron suggests that there must be something wrong
with either Chevron's implicit theory of deference, or its practical implications,
or both. In this part, I will attempt to spell out why Chevron is incompatible
with fundamental tenets of American public law, and why the framework
proves to be so unsatisfactory in practice.
A. Chevron Theory
Chevron raises issues that go the heart of our understanding of the judicial
role under a system of separation of powers. In terms of formal separation of
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powers theory,103 interpretation of law is often said to be the exclusive prov-
ince of the judiciary.'0 This raises the "Marbury problem": if it is the role
of courts to "to say what the law is,"1 5 then how can courts defer to the
views of another branch of government on the meaning of the law?"tt In
terms of a functional theory of separation of powers, the purpose of an indepen-
dent judiciary is often described in terms of its capacity for checking arbitrari-
ness and aggrandizement by the other branches of government. 7 This raises
the problem of agency accountability: how can we structure judicial review of
agency action so that agencies have enough discretion to implement complex
regulatory programs, and yet assure that they do not become a tyrannical
"Fourth Branch" of government, immune from popular control?
One of the strengths of the Chevron doctrine is that it offers, if only
implicitly, answers to the Marbury and agency accountability problems. The
answers it provides, however, are radically different from those that were put
forth in the past, and are difficult to square with other, more enduring commit-
ments about the proper role of the courts in a system of separated powers.
In the early days of modern administrative law, the Marbury and agency
accountability dilemmas were usually resolved by borrowing from longstanding
notions about the relationship between judges and juries. Courts would defer
to agency findings of fact, but would decide all questions of law de novo.10
Under such a division of labor, courts would clearly retain final authority to
"say what the law is." And by independently ascertaining the meaning of the
agency's statutory authority in all cases, courts would provide a powerful
constraint against arbitrariness and aggrandizement.
This solution was short lived, however. The comparative advantage of
agencies is not limited to finding facts (or applying the law to facts), but
extends to resolving many questions of law as well. And if courts decide all
questions of law de novo-even where the meaning of the law is un-
certain-then the price of containing agency aggrandizement is very likely to
be judicial aggrandizement. In response to these shortcomings, the Court
abandoned the judge-jury model soon after the Administrative Procedure Act
103. On the distinction between formal and functional theories of separation of powers, see Rebecca
L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1522-31 (1991); Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 493-96 (1987); Peter L Strauss,
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987).
104. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).
105. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
106. See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 2: Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinter-
pretation of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 986, 988-89,
994-95 (1987).
107. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., OfLegislative Courts. Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 916, 978 (1988); see also Farina, supra note 6, at 467-99.
108. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); JAFFE, supra note 13.
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was enacted, gradually developing the multifactored contextual approach that,
as we have seen, dominated the pre-Chevron era."°
Chevron in effect advances a third solution to the Marbury and agency
accountability problems. The Marbury problem is resolved by a theory of
congressionally mandated deference. Courts reconcile their duty to "say what
the law is" with the practice of deferring to agency interpretations of law by
positing that Congress, in conferring authority on an agency to administer a
statute, has implicitly directed courts to defer to the agency's legal views.
Accountability is achieved under Chevron by reducing the role of judicial
review and relying instead on Presidential oversight.
Both halves of the Chevron solution are problematic at best. The mandatory
deference solution to the Marbury problem rests entirely on the presumption
that when Congress delegates the authority to administer a statute to an agency,
it wants courts to defer to that agency's interpretations of law. The evidence
that would support such a presumption is weak. Congress has never enacted
a statute that contains a general delegation of interpretative authority to agen-
cies. The very practice of enacting specific delegations of interpretative authori-
ty suggests that Congress understands that no such general authority exists.
Moreover, the one general statute on point, the Administrative Procedure Act,
directs reviewing courts to "decide all relevant questions of law." 110 If any-
thing, this suggests that Congress contemplated courts would always apply
independent judgment on questions of law, reserving deference for administra-
tive findings of fact or determinations of policy.
The strongest evidence in support of the Court's presumption is the fact
that Congress knows about the practice of judicial deference to agency inter-
pretations and has not acted to prohibit it."' But in order to establish that
Congress has mandated the practice of deference, the Court should be able to
point to more than a debatable inference from congressional inaction."' Chev-
109. See supra notes 7-29 and accompanying text. I describe how the contextual approach can be
squared with the Marbury and agency accountability concerns at infra text accompanying notes 175-76 and
accompanying text.
110. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988) (emphasis added).
111. For a number of years, Senator Dale Bumpers gathered considerable support for a proposed
amendment to the APA that would have affirmatively prohibited any judicial deference to agency interpreta-
tions of law. See generally James T. O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of the
Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1980). Failure to enact the Bumpers
Amendment may suggest congressional ratification of the deference doctrine. Drawing inferences from
unenacted legislation is always hazardous, however, and here more so than usual. Although the Bumpers
Amendment was never enacted, it drew consistent (and overwhelming) support-hardly suggesting that
Congress is in fact strongly committed to the deference doctrine. Instead, Congress may have failed to
approve the amendment out of inertia, because of timing problems, or because the impact of deference is
too diffuse to generate the concentrated political support needed to produce legislative action. See Farina,
supra note 6, at 473-74.
112. A recent decision dealing with judicial deference to an agency's interpretations of its own
regulations sought to explain the practice of deference in terms of a presumption of congressional intent
based on the agency's "historical familiarity" with the issue and its "policymaking expertise." Martin v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 111 S. Ct. 1171, 1177 (1991). In Martin the argument in
favor of the presumption of intent is based on policy arguments in favor of deferring to executive views,
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ron itself, in defining the judicial role in the interpretation of statutes, suggested
that courts have no authority to impose decisional rules that cannot be traced
to an authoritative judgment of Congress. Yet the Court could point to no
statute indicating that Congress has required that agencies, rather than courts,
interpret ambiguities and gaps in statutes." 3 A decisional framework that rests
on two foundations, one of which contradicts the other, is difficult to regard
as sound.
Chevron's solution to the agency accountability problem is also unsatisfac-
tory. Unlike previous discussions of the accountability problem, which tended
to assume that popular control comes about only through the election of
representatives who pass statutes that are then enforced by courts, Chevron
perceives a dual channel of popular control: one operating through the election
of representatives who pass statutes; the other through the election of the
President who directs the agents who implement those statutes. The Court
sought to forge a formula that would allow both channels of popular control
to operate by limiting courts to the enforcement of unambiguous legislative
directives, leaving all discretionary decisions to be disciplined by Presidential
oversight.
The Court's perception that there is a dual channel of control is an impor-
tant insight.1 4 But Presidential oversight has inherent limitations. Many ad-
ministrative entities-including the "independent" regulatory agencies and
"legislative" or Article I courts-enjoy various degrees of statutory immunity
from direct Presidential control.1 5 Several prominent separation of powers
decisions handed down since Chevron have legitimized these immunities," 6
diluting the power of the President to assure overall direction of those agents
who administer the law. But even without the Court's sanction for these
immunities, it is simply unrealistic, given the vastness of the federal bureaucra-
cy, to expect that the President or his principal lieutenants can effectively
monitor the policymaking activities of all federal agencies.1 7 Nor does it
the assumption being that if the Court finds these policies persuasive then Congress must too. Again,
however, the Court cited no direct evidence that Congress has in any context actually endorsed these
policies.
113. See Michael Hertz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1665-68 (1991).
114. See Harold Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REv. 207, 217
(1984); Lloyd Cutler & David Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YAIE L.. 1395, 1410-12
(1975); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239 (1989).
115. See Miller, supra note 44; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
116. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991) (suggesting that it is constitutionally
permissible for Congress to create an Article I court outside both the executive and the judicial branches);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding statute creating a commission exercising
rulemaking power as part of the judicial branch); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding statute
creating independent prosecutor insulated from removal by the President or Attorney General except for
good cause).
117. See Strauss, supra note 115.
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seem wise or appropriate to leave control of agency behavior to congressional
oversight hearings. 118 In the end, the primary protection against arbitrary or
aggrandizing action by agencies must remain the fundamental constitutional
limitation on all executive action-that it "comport with the terms set in
legislative directives."" 9 And the only effective institutional mechanism for
preserving this constraint is judicial review.
To be sure, Chevron does not eliminate all judicial enforcement of legal
limitations on executive action. But by restricting courts to enforcement of
"specific intentions" or "clear and unambiguous" statutory directives, it serious-
ly weakens the primary check on agency abuses while offering no adequate
alternative in its place. Of particular concern here is the matter of enforcing
boundary limitations. Over the years, the Supreme Court has permitted increas-
ingly broad delegations of discretionary authority to agencies, but only on the
understanding that the exercise of this delegated authority would be subject to
independent judicial review. 20 To the extent that broad delegations are often
ambiguous, Chevron undermines this understanding by suggesting that courts
must defer to an agency's interpretation of the scope of its own authority.'
As Professor Cynthia Farina puts it:
[A key assumption of Chevron-] that Congress may give agencies
primary responsibility not only for making policy within the limits of
their organic statutes, but also for defining those limits whenever the
text and surrounding legislative materials are ambiguous-is fundamen-
tally incongruous with the constitutional course by which the Court
came to reconcile agencies and separation of powers.'2
A possible solution to this particular difficulty would be to carve out yet
another exception to Chevron, this time for decisions that implicate the scope
of the agency's own jurisdiction. In fact, three Justices endorsed just such an
exception in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore.l23
The difficulty with the proposed exception, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his
concurring opinion, is that virtually any decision about the meaning of the
118. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis
Custodiet Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (Autumn
1991) (describing multiple difficulties associated with congressional oversight of EPA).
119. Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV.
1253, 1256 (1988).
120. See Touby v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1752, 1757-58 (1991), where the Court rejected a
nondelegation doctrine challenge to regulations not subject to judicial review, but only after concluding that
the regulations could be reviewed in individual enforcement actions. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion
expressly stated that the availability of judicial review was critical to the conclusion that the delegation was
constitutional. Id. at 1758 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490
U.S. 212, 218-19 (1989); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944).
121. Farina, supra note 6, at 487-88; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARv. L REv. 407, 446 (1989).
122. Farina, supra note 6, at 487-88.
123. 487 U.S. 354, 386-87 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
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substantive terms of a statute can be viewed as either expanding or contracting
an agency's "jurisdiction." 1" The question at issue in Chevron itself, concern-
ing the proper definition of a "stationary source" of air pollution, has implica-
tions for the scope of the EPA's regulatory power. So a "jurisdictional ques-
tions" exception to Chevron would either swallow the rule or lead to arbitrary
decisions based on explication of a notorious formalism ("jurisdiction").
In sum, Chevron seeks to resolve the central theoretical problems of the
modem administrative state by adopting a dubious fiction of delegated authority
and by reducing the role of the courts to a point that threatens to undermine
the principal constitutional constraint on agency misbehavior. Given these
failings, it is small wonder that the Court often seems wary of the Chevron
doctrine, applying it inconsistently at best.
B. Chevron Practice
The Court's general failure to abide by the teachings of Chevron-whether
by acts of omission or commission-also suggests that the framework frequent-
ly generates unwanted results. There are a number of reasons why Chevron
does not function well as a guide to determining the relative weight to be given
to judicial and agency views.
1. The Sequential Inquiry
Perhaps the most basic problem stems from the fact that Chevron casts the
relevant determinants in a sequential hierarchy: consideration ofjudicial compe-
tence first, consideration of administrative competence second. By sequencing
the inquiry in this fashion, Chevron almost guarantees that in every case the
independent views of the judiciary will be given either too much or too little
weight, and concomitantly, that the views of the agency will be given either
too little or too much deference. If the issue is resolved at step one, then the
court gives no consideration to the views of the executive and decides the
matter independently. If the issue is resolved at step two, then the court regards
the agency view as dispositive, unless it can say that it is unreasonable. In other
words, Chevron inevitably generates "one-sided" decisions. In those cases
where the Court feels that one-sidedness is appropriate, Chevron will do fine.
But if the Court perceives that a more refined approach is called for, Chevron
is a source of awkwardness. The predominant solution in the latter situation
appears to be to ignore Chevron.
For example, Chevron seems to rule out the previously common practice
of using executive interpretations as a "comfort factor" to confirm a judicial
124. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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interpretation based primarily on the text and legislative history."ss If all cases
fell into neat piles-unambiguous statutes in one pile, ambiguous statutes in
the other-this would entail no loss. Realistically, however, there is a broad
gray area where the existence of an administrative interpretation might help tip
the balance. Surely it makes no sense to forbid courts to draw upon the consen-
sus of the two branches in assuring the public that the correct result has been
reached in such a case.
Similarly, it was possible under the pre-Chevron regime to look to execu-
tive interpretations to disconfirm a conclusion based on an independent analysis
of text and history. Thus, even if the court found that judicial precedent or the
text suggested one answer, it might find this tentative judgment outweighed if,
say, a contrary administrative interpretation had been consistently followed for
many years, and this executive view had been ratified by a subsequent Con-
gress.ls 6 Chevron's sequential inquiry renders it impossible to reach this kind
of result. Although allowing administrative interpretations to overcome indepen-
dent analysis in this fashion is more controversial, it is really not that different
from the common practice of allowing judicial precedent to overcome a conclu-
sion drawn from an independent examination of text and history. 27 Indeed,
allowing especially strong executive interpretations to dominate judicial read-
ings provides a way of injecting a dynamic or evolutionary element into
statutory interpretation-in a way that is far more consistent with democratic
theory than permitting courts to do the updating.lt 8
The other half of the one-sidedness problem, of course, is that Chevron
eliminates any significant judicial input at step two. In practice, this has proved
to be less of a problem because a court that is convinced that judicial input
would be desirable has ways of avoiding the conclusion that the case should
be decided at step two: it can "rig" the inquiry at step one, either by overstating
the evidence that Congress had a specific intention or, more likely today, by
finding that the meaning of the statute is "plain." There are several examples
125. See supra text accompanying note 9.
126. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 591-93 (White, J.); id. at 619-20
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that longstanding agency interpretation ratified by Congress should prevail
over contrary interpretation suggested by prior Supreme Court opinion); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) (relying on agency interpretation ratified by Congress to bolster conclusion
supported only weakly by statutory text and history); see also John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic
Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233,284-315 (1990) (arguing that courts should defer to agency interpretation
mitigating the extreme consequences of "symbolic" environmental laws).
127. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989).
128. Judicial updating not only violates norms of democratic legitimacy, but is also inconsistent with
the concept of judicial "interpretation" as conventionally understood. See Steven D. Smith, Law Without
Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104 (1989) (criticizing T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,
87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1987)); see also 'William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. RE v. 1479 (1987) (advocating interpretation of statutes in light of evolving societal, political, and
legal context).
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among recently decided cases that I would put in this category.129 Alternative-
ly, the court can simply ignore the Chevron framework, following the Supreme
Court's most common avoidance device. But both techniques rest on misappli-
cation of supposedly controlling law and represent an unhappy solution to a
problem that should not exist. It would seem far better to devise a method for
courts to articulate their misgivings directly.
2. The Dividing Line
A second set of problems is generated by the method for determining the
dividing line between the two steps in the sequential inquiry. As we have seen,
the balance is determined by the theory of interpretation adopted at step one.
As originally formulated, Chevron described the judicial inquiry in such a way
that it would almost certainly produce routine deference to agency views.
Chevron's theory of the judicial role at step one is the statutory analogue
of what in constitutional law has been called "strict intentionalism." As Dean
Paul Brest has put it, "Strict intentionalism requires the interpreter to determine
how the adopters would have applied a provision to a given situation, and to
apply it accordingly." 130 The problem with such a theory of interpretation is
that no matter how precise the meaning of the text, unanticipated questions will
invariably arise about how the text is to apply in different circumstances.
13 1
129. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26 (1990) (rejecting Office of Management and
Budget's construction of the Paperwork Reduction Act largely on the basis of structural arguments and
canons of construction); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990) (rejecting the Secretary of Health and
Human Service's interpretation of the Social Security Act based on inferences drawn from reading two
provisions together and equitable considerations); Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158
(1989) (finding an agency interpretation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act contrary to the "plain
meaning" of the statute, even though determining the precise meaning of the Act was a "somewhat more
difficult task").
130. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 222
(1980). Such a theory of interpretation is vulnerable to attack for all the reasons textualists like Justice Scalia
attack intentionalism generally: Congress enacts texts, not intentions, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d
1340 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (holding that where conflict exists, language of statute prevails over
legislative history); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A REEVALUATION
OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1989); reconstructing historical intentions is
very difficult given the limited information we have available; see, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, III S. Ct. 2476,2488 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that committee reports are unreliable
as a "genuine indicator of congressional intent"); and heavy reliance on legislative history leads to strategic
manipulation by legislative insiders, see, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J.
concurring) (suggesting that references to district court decisions were inserted in committee report by
staffers "to influence judicial construction"). But it is not my purpose here to take sides in the debate
between intentionalism (whether of the strict or general variety) and textualism. The only point is that the
particular brand of intentionalism endorsed by Chevron-strict intentionalism-results in a very small role
for courts at step one.
131. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); Frank
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 62-63
(1988). The point has been recognized in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Robert Bennett, Objectivity in
Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445 (1984); Martha Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 942-45 (1986).
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In the familiar example,132 if the statute says "no vehicles are permitted in
the park," does this language apply to bicycles? Or, if the legislature anticipates
this application, and provides that "no motor vehicles are permitted in the
park," does this version apply to motorized wheel chairs? Given the limits of
human imagination, it is virtually impossible for the legislature to formulate
a specific intention about how a provision should be applied to all or even most
situations. The process of application, especially over time, will always outrun
the understanding of even the most farsighted legislature. For this reason, to
ask the interpreter to "ascertai[n] that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue," as Chevron demands, 33 is to ask a question that will yield
an affirmative answer-at least an honest affirmative answer-in only a tiny
number of cases. 134
Under the Chevron framework, there is only one way to expand the small
judicial role contemplated by the specific intentions theory-reformulate the
nature of the inquiry at step one. The cure, unfortunately, may be as bad as the
disease. As we have seen, recent decisions have begun to drop the specific
intentions requirement in favor of a "plain meaning" formulation. 35 But this
leaves unanswered several critical questions about what kinds of interpretative
aids courts may consult at step one. Must the court find the statute plain on its
face? Or may it be plain after consulting extrinsic sources, like dictionary
definitions, definitions contained (explicitly or implicitly) in other statutes, or
considerations of the structure of the act? In its more latitudinarian versions,
where the court looks to considerations of structure and purpose in deciding
whether the meaning is "plain," the plain meaning inquiry tends to converge
with a "clearly preferred meaning" approach. 136 If this happens, then Chevron
would suffer from the exact opposite of the problem that plagued the original
formulation: if step one does not completely swallow step two, at least it will
have dramatically expanded-perhaps too far-in the opposite direction.
On other occasions the Court has not committed to either a "specific
intentions" method, or to a textualist method, but has stated the relevant inquiry
simply in terms of whether the statute is "ambiguous" or "unclear." 137 This
formulation leaves even more questions unanswered. To what extent may the
court resolve the meaning of the statute at step one based on inferences drawn
from legislative history or considerations of statutory purpose? May it use
canons of construction based on linguistic usage? Canons based on substantive
132. See, e.g., H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961); Brest, supra note 130, at 209-10.
133. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
134. The Court has recognized this point outside the Chevron context. See Moskal v. United States,
111 S. Ct. 461, 467 (1990) ("This Court has never required that every permissible application of a statute
be expressly referred to in its legislative history."); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980)
("This Court frequently has observed that a statute is not to be confined to the 'particular application[s] ...
contemplated by the legislators."') (quoting Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90 (1945)).
135. See supra text accompanying note 99.
136. See supra text accompanying note 100.
137. See cases cited supra note 94.
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policy considerations? Given the wide range of possible answers to these
questions, the Chevron framework becomes at best unpredictable, and at worst
a vehicle for complete substitution of judicial judgment for the views of the
agency.
In short, the reformulation of the judicial inquiry at step one will have at
least one of two consequences. First, it will result in a considerable sacrifice
of the formality of the original Chevron structure, and with it, much of the
simplicity and predictability that made the two-step procedure seem attractive.
More problematically, if the reformulation results in a greatly enlarged judicial
role at step one-as recent cases suggest may be happening-then it would
have the paradoxical effect of elevating the courts rather than agencies to the
role of primary policymaker. The original rationale for Chevron-the need to
have statutory gaps filled by the most democratically accountable decision-
maker-would be turned on its head.
There are several reasons why we should view the potential transformation
of Chevron into a doctrine of antideference with alarm. The practice of defer-
ring to executive interpretations of statutes performs many valuable functions:
it allows policy to be made by actors who are politically accountable; it draws
upon the specialized knowledge of administrators; it injects an element of
flexibility into statutory interpretation; and it helps assure nationally uniform
constructions.13 As statutes become increasingly complex, and courts tend
to be increasingly formalistic in their approach to statutory interpretation, a
robust measure of deference to agency interpretations may be, if anything, more
imperative than ever before. In fact, if courts do the gap filling at step one
under the "plain meaning" nostrum by applying dictionary definitions, rules of
grammar, and canons of construction, then the content of national policy will
be determined by courts without any consideration of the substantive values
at issue in the policy disputes-either those that animated Congress or those
articulated by the agency charged with administration of the statute.
Finally, there is a more fundamental difficulty with the focus on judicial
interpretation at step one. The Chevron framework makes the decision to defer
turn on some conception, either explicit or implicit, of what kind of judicial
interpretation is legitimate. But there is no a priori reason why the sphere of
deference should always be the exact mirror image of whatever a majority of
the Court believes on any given day is permissible in the name of judicial
interpretation. Surely there are other variables-such as the degree of the
agency's expertise and the existence of reliance interests implicated by the
138. See generally Diver, supra note 11, at 585-92 (discussing a variety of utilitarian arguments for
deference to administrative interpretations, including agency expertise and flexibility); Richard L Pierce,
The Role of Constitutional and Political Theoty in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469,520-21 (1985)
(arguing that deference to agency interpretations promotes political accountability); Silberman, supra note
44 (deference serves ends of democratic theory and uniformity); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases
Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 87 COLti. L. REV. 1093 (1987) (deference required to assure uniformity in interpretation).
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agency's interpretation-that also ought to have some bearing on the decision
to defer. By making the transition from independent judgment to deference turn
solely on the amenability of the issue to independent judicial resolution, the
Chevron framework excludes these considerations.
C. A New and Improved Chevron?
Could the Court improve on the present state of affairs by tinkering with
the Chevron framework? No doubt some beneficial reforms are possible. For
example, the Court could reformulate the inquiry at step one in terms of degree
of judicial certitude about statutory meaning, rather than in terms that implicate
interpretative method. 139 Thus, it could ask whether the statute admits of only
"one possible meaning," rather than posing the question in terms of whether
Congress had a "specific intention" on the point or whether the text of the
statute is "plain." Such a reform might offer a "compromise" position on the
judicial role that would provide a more robust check on agency misbehavior
than the original Chevron without going to the opposite extreme of encouraging
judicial substitution of judgment.
But no matter how much tinkering is done with the formulation of the
inquiry at step one, a number of serious and irremediable problems would
remain. The framework would still provide no logical role for the traditional
deference factors; it would still generate one-sided decisions; and it would still
require the deference decision to be based exclusively on a consideration of
judicial competence to exercise independent judgment to the exclusion of other
factors. Moreover, it is unclear that any formulation of the proper judicial
inquiry at step one can-over a wide range of cases-satisfactorily reconcile
the desire to draw upon the comparative advantages of agencies as interpreters
with the desire that courts control agency arbitrariness and aggrandizement. In
light of the manifold problems associated with the Chevron doctrine, and the
persistent gulf between theory and practice, it is time to consider whether an
alternative framework might do better.
IV. THE EXECUTIVE PRECEDENT MODEL
In this part, I offer an alternative to Chevron-the executive precedent
model. The basic idea assimilates the deference doctrine into the general
judicial practice of following precedent. The difference is that the "precedent"
the courts would be asked to follow is generated by a different branch of
government. Just as courts generally adhere to interpretations of statutes
139. See JAFFE, supra note 13, at 572 (suggesting that the relevant inquiry is whether "thejudges are
themselves convinced that [a] certain reading, or application, of the statute is the correct-or the only
faithful-reading or application"); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2092 ("If the court has a firm conviction that
the agency interpretation violates the statute, that interpretation must fail.").
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embodied in judicial precedents, so they would generally follow the interpreta-
tions of statutes embodied in prior decisions by executive branch agencies.
A. Executive Interpretation of Law
The executive precedent model begins with the premise that entities charged
with the execution of the law, including the President, executive departments,
and independent regulatory agencies, have an inherent power to interpret
enacted laws. Even though the President and the entities that assist the President
in the execution of law have no inherent power to "make law,' once Con-
gress has delegated authority to executive actors under law, the executive
agencies must determine what that law means, and need not await a further
delegation of interpretative authority from Congress to do so.
The constitutional basis for an inherent executive power to interpret the law
is straightforward. The Constitution expressly grants the President "executive
power," and directs the President to see that the laws are "faithfully execut-
ed." '141 The conferral of these powers would seem to presuppose that the
President and those who serve under his direction have the capacity to ascertain
the meaning of the law. Indeed, law interpretation is an inevitable and necessary
byproduct of the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive
branch.142 Just as courts must interpret the law in order to resolve cases and
controversies that arise within their jurisdiction, so executive officials must
interpret the law in order to promulgate regulations, bring enforcement actions,
instruct employees how to carry out programs, or perform any of the other
myriad tasks entrusted to agencies. In fact, because only a fraction of executive
actions end up in court, administrative actors engage in law interpretation with
greater frequency and over a wider range of cases than courts do. 43 If only
the courts had the capacity to interpret law, our system of government could
not continue to function.
Moreover, although executive interpretations occur in a variety of "for-
mats,""' they share much in common with judicial precedent. 45 Executive
interpretations are usually written, are generally accompanied by statements of
140. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (steel seizure case);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
141. U.S. CONST. art. 11, §§ 1, 3.
142. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) ("Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to
implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law."); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) ("In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the
Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is
due great respect from the others."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L REV.
905 (1989-90).
143. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 186 (1983) (judicial review touches less
than one percent of the Social Security disability caseload).
144. See Anthony, supra note 7, at 7-14.
145. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 (1987) (noting that reliance on
precedent not limited to courts of law but "is part of life in general").
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reasons,1 46 and often respond to arguments by affected entities supporting or
opposing the interpretation. Furthermore, the written statements of reasons that
accompany executive interpretations serve many of the same functions as do
the written opinions that accompany judicial decisions. They establish the
legitimacy of the interpretation by demonstrating that the executive construction
has a sound basis in law and policy.147 They clarify the scope of the interpre-
tation so that similar issues that arise in the future can be quickly resolved
without having to "reinvent the wheel."'148 They offer instructions to subordi-
nate employees for applying the interpretation in analogous but nonidentical
circumstances. Finally, they explain to members of the public the position the
government has taken so that they can make appropriate adjustments in their
behavior and plan for the future. 149 Thus, it seems highly appropriate to speak
of executive interpretations as a separate system of precedent-executive
precedent. 150
B. The Judicial System of Following Precedent
Given that both the executive branch and the judicial branch generate
interpretations of statutes that can be regarded as "precedent," what is the basis
for the judicial practice of deferring to executive precedent? The executive
146. In this respect at least, it is more natural to speak of executive branch decisions as "precedent"
than it would be to speak of congressional legislation as precedent. Administrative agencies, like courts,
typically vote to approve official explanations given for their actions, such as agency adjudicatory orders
or Federal Register notices. Congress, in contrast, usually does not incorporate statements explaining
particular rules set forth in statutes. Explanations may be found in legislative history, but Congress does
not as a whole vote to approve legislative history, nor is it sent to the President for his signature or veto.
Still, the Court has on occasion treated congressional legislation as "precedent" supporting a particular
interpretation of the Constitution. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 690-91 (1892) (treating prior statutes
delegating discretion to executive as precedent supporting the constitutionality of delegation). See generally
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV.
129 (1893) (arguing that courts should defer to legislative interpretations of ambiguous constitutional
provisions).
147. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 723,
749-55 (1988).
148. See RICHARD WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 72-73 (1961); Schauer, supra note 145,
at 599.
149. See MELvIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 10-12 (1988) (discussing the
requirement that judicial decisions be "replicable" by private parties and their advisors); Schauer, supra
note 145, at 597-98; WASSERSTROM, supra note 148, at 66-69.
150. Indeed, certain types of administrative decisions-adjudications-have legal consequences largely
indistinguishable from judicial decisions. Executive agencies can enter orders for the payment of money
(damages) and cease and desist orders (injunctions). See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833 (1986) (agency may adjudicate common law claim for money damages); American Airlines
v. North Am. Airlines, 351 U.S. 79 (1956) (Civil Aeronautics Board may properly issue cease and desist
order). Failure to abide by an agency order can result in sanctions for contempt. Regal Knitwear Co. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945). And courts "have long favored application of the common-law doctrines of
collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those determinations of administrative
bodies that have attained finality." Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2169
(1991). Although I would not confine the notion of executive precedent to statements of reasons in
adjudicatory decisions, the parallel to judicial precedent here is especially striking.
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precedent model locates that practice in the courts' inherent powers to develop
principles for resolving cases and controversies.151 We know that the "judicial
power" described in Article III encompasses the practice of following prece-
dent, even though this practice is not expressly authorized in any source of
positive law.152 Indeed, the norm of following precedent is ubiquitous in the
Anglo-American legal system. The executive precedent model would assimilate
the judicial practice of deferring to executive interpretations into this system
of following precedent. Courts would be deemed to have inherent authority to
develop guidelines for deferring to executive precedents in appropriate circum-
stances.
This inherent authority, like other products of judicial self-governance (such
as common law rules of procedure 53), would be subject to congressional
modification."M Thus, if Congress were expressly to instruct courts to defer or
not to defer to particular agency interpretations, these instructions would
supersede the norms of following precedent. But absent express instructions
from Congress about the allocation of authority, courts would develop their own
standards for determining when to defer to prior executive interpretations of
law.
In determining where executive precedent might fit into the judicial system
of following precedent, it is useful to consider briefly the various ways courts
treat different types of judicial precedent. None of these understandings is
compelled by any statutory or constitutional provision. Rather, they have
emerged over the years through a gradual process of judicial self-definition.
Decisions of superior courts are the most powerful form of precedent. They
are regarded as legally binding on lower courts. 55 A court's own previous
151. See generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132 (1991) ("It has long been
understood that '[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature
of their institution,' powers 'which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the
exercise of all others."') (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)).
152. There can be no doubt that the Framers of the Constitution understood that the norm of following
precedent was an integral element of the functioning of courts. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471
(Alexander Hamilton) (I. Cooke ed., 1961) ("To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable
that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents."). For example, Blackstone, a familiar legal
source to the Framers, pronounced that precedent must be followed "unless flatly absurd or unjust." I
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 70 (Facsimile ed. 1979).
153. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
1, 43 (1825).
154. In the context of constitutional adjudication, Professor Monaghan has questioned whether Congress
would have the authority to direct the Court to disregard the principle of stare decisis. Monaghan, supra
note 147, at 754-55. But given Congress' acknowledged power to legislate standards of review of agency
action under delegated statutory authority, there can be little doubt that Congress could direct the courts
to decide questions of statutory interpretation de novo, or (short of constitutional violation) to deem an
agency's interpretation authoritative-or anything in between.
155. See, e.g., Thurston Motor Lines v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533,535 (1983); Hutto v. Davis,
454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982). It is not plausible to view this norm as simply grounded in an empirical
generalization that a lower court will get reversed by a superior court if it fails to follow superior court
precedent. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, does not begin to have the institutional capacity to review
all decisions of the federal courts of appeals to ensure that they remain faithful to Supreme Court precedent.
See Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987). The same is
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decisions are not as binding as decisions of superior courts. But their own
opinions are also accorded more than deference; under the doctrine of stare
decisis, they are regarded as enjoying a very strong presumption of correct-
ness. 56 In practice, this means they will be followed unless they are over-
ruled, and generally speaking they will be overruled only if there is a very
strong justification for doing so. 157
A third type of precedent is made up of prior decisions of tribunals of
coordinate jurisdiction. The most familiar example is when one federal court
of appeals confronts an issue that has been decided previously by another court
of appeals. Here the judicial attitude is more uncertain. English courts and
nineteenth-century American courts developed the doctrine of the "controlling
decision," whereby the precedent of a court of coordinate jurisdiction was
regarded as binding as a matter of comity.158 After the creation of the federal
courts of appeals in 1891, and the reconceptualization of the role of the Su-
preme Court as being devoted largely to the resolution of conflicts between the
courts of appeals, the attitude of the federal courts of appeals relaxed consider-
ably.'59 Some courts came to speak of a duty of following the precedent of
another circuit unless it could be said to be "clearly erroneous." 16 Others
stressed that such precedent is not "binding," and implied that intercircuit
precedent would be followed only to the extent it is "persuasive"--suggesting
that it is entitled to no deference at all. 6' Perhaps the most accurate synthesis
of the contemporary understanding is that one court of appeals will "give most
respectful consideration to the decisions of the other courts of appeals,'1 62
probably true in many of the large state court systems.
156. California v. FERC, 110 S. Ct. 2024, 2028-30 (1990); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 172 (1989); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986)
(referring to "the strong presumption of continued validity that adheres in the judicial interpretation of a
statute").
157. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172. It has even been argued that in the statutory context, the presumption
of correctness should be absolute. See Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 177 (1989).
158. See Alan D. Vestal, Relitigation By Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis of
Judicial Policies, 55 N.C. L. REV. 123, 129-40 (1977).
159. Id. at 140-66. Professor Vestal concluded his comprehensive 1977 survey by noting that "the
doctrine of controlling decision may not have the vitality it once had," although he thought many of the
departures from the doctrine were unexplained, and "the underlying principles that have been the basis for
the doctrine of controlling decision have lost none of their vitality." Id. at 166. For an interesting argument
in support of applying a rule of stare decisis to intercircuit precedent-based largely on the desirable effects
on the Supreme Court's workload-see Walter V. Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. . 452
(1983); Walter V. Schaefer, Reliance on the Law of the Circuit-A Requiem, 1985 DUKE LJ. 690.
160. See, e.g., Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767, 773 (8th Cir.) ("We have in a long line of
opinions declared that, on an unsettled question of federal law, while a decision by another Court of Appeals
is not compulsively binding upon us, we will, in the interest of judicial uniformity, accept it as persuasive
and follow it, unless we are clearly convinced that it is wrong." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
866 (1960).
161. See, e.g., City Storesv. LernerShops,410 F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("Decisions of district
courts and other courts of appeals are, of course, not binding on us and are looked to only for their
persuasive effect.").
162. Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.).
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especially where the prior interpretation is a "reasoned decision" 161 or there
is an "accumulation of authority."''16 In effect, a legal interpretation of another
circuit is regarded as prima facie correct, and is given more or less deference
depending on contextual factors such as the extent of consideration given the
issue by the other circuit and how long its precedent has been followed.
Finally, there are precedents of inferior judicial tribunals. A court will
nearly always take note of the view of the tribunal whose decision is under
review; it is regarded at the very least as an interesting datum. Generally
speaking, however, the superior court will resolve all questions of law de novo;
the views of the inferior court will be followed only to the extent they are
regarded as persuasive. 165 The decisions of inferior tribunals other than the
one under review are noted only sporadically.6 6 Thus, the general understand-
ing is that lower court precedent is not entitled to any measure of deference
by the superior tribunal.
Which of the four attitudes toward different types of judicial precedent
should provide the relevant benchmark for determining the attitude of courts
toward executive precedent? We can quickly dismiss the possibilities that
executive precedent should be treated like the decisions of superior courts or
like a court's own prior decisions. Part of our received understanding of the
"judicial power" is that courts have final say in articulating the meaning of the
law in cases brought before them.1 67 It would seem to follow from this that
courts are not legally bound by executive interpretations of statutes. For similar
reasons, it would seem to be inconsistent with our understanding of the judicial
power to posit that courts are bound by executive precedents the way they must
follow their own precedents.
The two most plausible models for executive precedent are the treatment
of decisions by courts of coordinate jurisdiction and the treatment of decisions
by inferior courts. For a variety of reasons, I think that the treatment of deci-
sions by courts of coordinate jurisdiction provides the best analogy. Some of
these reasons will unfold only as the full implications of the model are spelled
163. Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980).
164. IB JAMES W. MOORE Er AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.402, at 15 (2d ed. 1984).
165. See generally Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217 (1991) (federal court of appeals
should not defer to district court's interpretation of state law in diversity suits).
166. Occasionally one will find the suggestion that a widespread consensus among lower tribunals over
a long period of time is entitled to some deference. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74-76 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (Court should defer to unanimous consensus among courts of appeals about
meaning of Securities Act exemption); United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167 (1931) (Court should hesitate
to set aside uniform construction given to statute by lower courts for more than 60 years). And from time
to time, courts will rely on arguments or insights contained in particular lower court decisions, especially
if the judge is widely respected. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 293 n.8 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Judge Friendly's discussion on the general
issue of denials of petitions to reopen continues to merit our respect.").
167. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (rejecting claim of unreviewable executive
authority to determine when executive communications are legally privileged); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (courts have power to compel executive officers to perform legal duty as
determined by court).
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out. One overarching reason for selecting the precedent of courts of coordinate
jurisdiction as the proper lodestar, however, bears emphasis at the outset.
In comparing the situation of superior courts and inferior courts as law
interpreters, the comparative advantage resides almost entirely with the superior
court. 161 Thus, there is no reason for a superior court to defer to the judg-
ments of a trial court on questions of law. But when we compare courts and
agencies, there are strengths and weaknesses on both sides of the ledger.
Executive interpreters have greater expertise on matters that are highly technical
or complex; they have more familiarity with the overall structure of a statutory
program, and with the policies followed under those programs; and they are
more accountable to the public. On the other hand, courts are more insulated
from political pressures than agencies; their members are more likely to be
selected for their legal abilities than are agency heads; they may be able to hire
better law clerks; and they may have more time to do research and write
opinions, if only because they are exempt from the statutory deadlines often
imposed on agencies.
The point is not that agencies are always better interpreters than courts are
or vice versa, but simply that there are advantages and disadvantages on both
sides. This suggests that, at least as a first approximation, the treatment of
precedent of courts of parallel authority appears to supply the best benchmark
for establishing the judicial attitude toward executive precedent.'69 Of course,
this is just an analogy. There are a number of aspects in which the treatment
of executive precedent should differ from that of intercircuit precedent. The
analogy is useful, however, for it demonstrates that it is possible to ground the
deference doctrine in the practice of following precedent. As we shall see,
moreover, the treatment of the precedent of courts of parallel authority appears
168. See Salve Regina College, 111 S. Ct. at 1221; Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study
of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 923
(1989).
169. If courts should treat the interpretations of executive agencies like the precedent of a tribunal of
coordinate jurisdiction, then should agencies treat the opinions of courts the same way, i.e., as only
presumptively correct and entitled to more or less weight depending on contextual factors? This is a variation
on the problem of agency "nonacquiescence" in judicial interpretations of law. See Samuel Estreicher &
Richard Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989); Vestal,
supra note 158. My answer would be that, as a matter of theory, agencies must give judicial precedent no
more deference than courts must give executive precedent. Courts render judgments that bind the parties
before them (including agencies) and such judgments must of course be obeyed. They also issue statements
of reason-opinions-that help readers (including agencies) predict how they will resolve future controver-
sies. But they do not issue edicts that bind all the world, as the Constitution, a statute, or an agency
regulation does. See John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the
Constitution, 73 CoRNELL L. REV. 371 (1988); Edwin Meese, III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL.
L. REV. 979 (1987). In theory, therefore, agencies could regard judicial precedent the same way courts
regard agency precedent.
At a practical level, however, the fact that courts review agencies rather than vice versa may well
dictate a more accommodating attitude by agencies. Thus, agencies may wish to "acquiesce" in judicial
opinions for future cases even if those opinions are not binding as a matter of law, and even if the agency,
as a matter of interbranch precedent-following, is not convinced by the court's analysis.
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to share many of the main features of the administrative deference doctrine as
it has been historically practiced and understood.
C. The Model Stated
If we view the deference doctrine as part of the system of precedent, then
the decision whether or to what extent to defer to executive interpretations
would in each case entail a three-part inquiry: (1) Is there an executive prece-
dent? (2) How strong is that precedent? (3) Given the strength of the executive
precedent, does an independent judicial examination of the question of statutory
interpretation compel a different result?
1. Is There an Executive Precedent?
Not every interpretation of law by an executive agency should be regarded
as a "precedent," at least for purposes of determining the judicial response.
Here, I would suggest that the relevant distinction is between an interpretation
initially advanced when the agency is acting as an independent decisionmaker
and an interpretation first advanced when the agency is acting as a party to
judicial proceedings. Insofar as the agency adopts an interpretation when it is
wearing its independent decisionmaker hat, its views should be regarded as
"precedent." Included in this category would be any interpretation embodied
in a decision by an agency that is legally binding on actors outside the agency
itself, such as the promulgation of legislative rules, the issuance of administra-
tive orders, or the award of licenses and grants. In addition, any legal interpreta-
tion embodied in an official statement of agency position that predates a
particular judicial controversy would count as precedent. Examples would
include interpretative rules, policy statements, agency enforcement guidelines,
and previous opinion letters.
When an agency initially advances an interpretation while it is wearing its
judicial litigant hat, however, the interpretation should not be regarded as
precedent. This is not because the agency loses any comparative advantage it
may have as an interpreter when it changes hats. Instead, judicial norms about
impartial adjudication preclude giving the interpretation precedential weight.
When there are two parties before a court contesting the meaning of the law,
it is generally understood that the court should decide the matter impartially
and independently, without giving one party's views greater weight simply
because of that party's status.17 Thus, insofar as the agency view is not em-
bodied in a previous authoritative expression of its views, the agency view
should be treated as no different from the position of any other party. Examples
170. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F2d 785, 789 (2d Cir.), afftd, 328 U.S.
275 (1946); Anthony, supra note 7, at 60 ('It would exceed the bounds of fair play to allow an institution-
ally self-interested advocacy position, which 'may properly carry a bias,' to control the judicial outcome.").
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of agency action that fall into this category and thus should not be regarded as
precedent would include an interpretation implicit in the decision of a prosecu-
tor to file criminal charges, an interpretation reflected in the decision of an
agency to institute judicial enforcement proceedings, or an interpretation
advanced for the first time in legal briefs filed in court defending a previously
taken agency action.
2. How Strong Is the Executive Precedent?
Once it is determined that there is an executive precedent on point, the next
step would be to ascertain how "strong" it is. This inquiry, which would
necessarily be fairly judgmental, would entail two distinct components.
The first component turns on the level in the executive hierarchy from
which the intepretation emanates. Under the executive precedent model, the
authority of executive agencies to interpret law derives not from a delegation
of interpretative authority from Congress, but from the President's executive
power and constitutional obligation to see that the laws are faithfully executed.
Thus, the more directly accountable the interpreter is to the President, the more
the decision would partake of the President's constitutional authority and the
stronger it would be regarded as executive precedent. To illustrate: 171 an
interpretation contained in a letter from a regional office of the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) would not be as strong as one contained
in a "program instruction" adopted by the general counsel of HHS, which
would not be as strong as one reflected in a policy directive issued by the
Secretary of HHS, which would not be as strong as an interpretation directly
approved by the President. This hierarchy of authority, of course, directly
parallels the understanding of the strength of precedent in the judicial hierarchy,
where the Supreme Court partakes of the "judicial power" by direct grant from
the Constitution, and lower courts possess the judicial power only in accordance
with their position in relation to the Supreme Court.
1 72
The second component of the strength of executive precedent is derived
by analogy to the treatment of precedent of courts of coordinate jurisdiction
within the system of judicial precedent. Consider some of the factors that a
court might look to in determining whether to follow the precedent of a judicial
tribunal of coordinate authority: How long has the precedent of the other
tribunal been followed? Has it been criticized by later decisions, or is it incon-
sistent with another precedent of equal status? Has the public come to rely on
171. The illustration is derived from Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 144 n.25 (1979).
172. Unlike the Chevron doctrine, the executive precedent model does not require that there be a unitary
executive branch. See supra note 44. Everything else being equal, however, the greater the "independence"
of an executive entity from Presidential oversight and control, the weaker its precedent. Thus, a statutory
interpretation adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission-an "independent" regulatory agen-
cy-would be entitled to less deference than would an interpretation adopted by a Cabinet officer such as
the Attorney General or the Secretary of HHS, both of whom are removable by the President at will.
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the interpretation? Does the interpretation concern a matter as to which the
other tribunal has particular familiarity or expertise? Was the issue fully briefed
and argued in the other tribunal, and is the other tribunal's decision supported
by a thorough and reasoned opinion? Has the interpretation of the other tribunal
been ratified by subsequent congressional action? As developed more fully
below, these factors bear an uncanny resemblance to the contextual factors
courts developed in the pre-Chevron era in order to determine whether, or to
what extent, to defer to executive interpretations. The analogy to intercircuit
precedent helps to sharpen our understanding of why many of these factors
should be relevant and which ones are most important in particular settings.
3. Does an Independent Judicial Judgment Compel a Different Result?
Once the court has established that there is an executive precedent and has
determined (roughly) how strong that precedent is, then it must make an
independent inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient reason to overcome
the presumption of correctness that such a precedent enjoys. In undertaking this
inquiry, the court could call upon any and all of the "traditional tools of
statutory interpretation"1 73 that would be relevant in interpreting the statute
de novo. The conclusions reached through this kind of analysis-ranging from
ajudgment that the statute can have only one possible meaning to a conclusion
that it is utterly opaque-would then be considered in light of the conclusions
reached about the strength of the executive precedent. A strong precedent-such
as an interpretation adopted by the Secretary of HHS in a well reasoned
decision consistently maintained over a long period of time-would be rejected
only if the court were firmly convinced it was wrong. A weak precedent-such
as a recent letter from a regional office of HHS asserting the interpretation in
a conclusory fashion-would be disregarded if the court had a fair doubt about
its correctness.
This is an admittedly imprecise decisional formula. But there are simply
too many relevant variables to reduce the inquiry to a simple algorithm. Nor
is it particularly surprising that this should be the case. After all, the same must
be said of the role of judicial precedent in statutory interpretation: no single
formula can capture the process by which courts determine the competing
claims of prior judicial precedent and a de novo judicial examination of statuto-
ry language and legislative intent. The only difference where executive prece-
dent is involved is that the precedent comes from a different branch of govern-
ment.174
173. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
174. An alternative basis for a model not grounded in presumed delegation is suggested by the doctrine
of practical construction: administrative decisions could be seen as a form of "conduct" that is evidence
of the practical construction of a statute by the party charged with its implementation. See Annotation, Effect
of practical or administrative construction of a statute on subsequent judicial construction, 73 L. Ed. 322
(1929). The doctrine of practical construction is often encountered in cases construing treaties, see Eastern
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V. THE MODELS COMPARED
The proposed executive precedent model shares many of the strengths of
the Chevron doctrine in that it strives to encourage courts to defer to the
judgments of political actors who have greater public accountability and
specialized knowledge. Yet, I will contend, it avoids Chevron's major theoreti-
cal and practical failings. Moreover, the model is not radical, unless perhaps
one assumes (contrary to fact) that the full-blown Chevron doctrine actually
defines the status quo. Indeed, a major part of the justification for the model
is that it coheres better with both existing and historical practice than does the
Chevron formulation. Finally, the executive precedent idea has consequences
for judicial, administrative, and congressional behavior that, on balance, are
superior to the effects of Chevron.
A. Overcoming Chevron's Theoretical and Practical Problems
Any theory of deference must come to terms with the Marbury problem
and the problem of agency accountability. We can now see that there are three
general strategies for accomplishing these ends. 175
The first-which prevailed fleetingly when modern administrative law was
taking form-is to allow courts to review all questions of law de novo. This
solution totally eliminates the Marbury problem and provides a powerful
potential check on agency abuse. But it deprives us of any comparative advan-
tage agencies may have as interpreters, and it gives the courts too much
discretionary power over the formulation of policy.
The second strategy-that of Chevron-is grounded in the notion of
mandatory deference. Courts seek to remain faithful to their duty to "say what
the law is" while deferring to executive interpretations by positing that Con-
gress has mandated that they defer. Agency accountability is secured by having
courts enforce clear statutory directives and by relying on Presidential oversight.
As we have seen,176 this strategy, as pursued by Chevron, falls victim to
several difficulties, including the need to adopt a doubtful fiction of delegated
interpretative authority, and to abandon a good part of the only effective check
on the abuse of power by agencies.
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1499 (1991); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 403 (1985), and
traces its origins to the doctrine of practical construction in the law of contracts. See SAMUEL WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 623 (3d ed. 1961). As suggested by these origins, however,
the doctrine ultimately rests on the idea of mutual assent-if both parties to an agreement concur in a certain
practical implementation, then this suggests that both parties have assented to this construction. The absence
of anything resembling a conventional bilateral agreement in the agency setting may make this particular
analogy problematic as a basis for a model of deference to administrative decisions.
175. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
368-69 (1986).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 7-29.
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The third strategy-that pursued by the executive precedent model-is
grounded in discretionary deference. Courts remain faithful to the duty to say
what the law is, but in exercising this duty they conclude as a matter of self-
governance that the best guide to the meaning of the law is often to follow the
prior interpretations of a coordinate branch of government. At the same time,
courts hold agencies accountable by upholding only the exercise of sound
executive discretion: they affirm decisions that present a combination of strong
precedent and/or congruence with congressional intent, but they reverse deci-
sions that present a combination of weak precedent and/or tension with congres-
sional intent. This approach therefore allows courts to continue to act as a check
on abuse of delegated power.
1. Theoretical Failings
By grounding the practice of deference in norms of judicial comity rather
than legislative compulsion, the executive precedent model avoids Chevron's
most glaring weakness: the need to posit a fictitious delegation of power from
Congress to executive agencies. Instead, the practice of deference is derived
from two relatively uncontroversial constitutional propositions: (1) executive
entities have an inherent power to interpret the laws they are charged with
enforcing, and (2) the courts have an inherent power to develop norms for
following precedent that can be extended to encompass the practice of deferring
to executive precedent.
Because the executive precedent model grounds deference in inherent
powers, it is unaffected by the ambiguity over Congress' true intentions regard-
ing the allocation of interpretative authority. Chevron fails in the face of this
uncertainty because ambiguity does not add up to a mandatory directive to
defer. But if courts have inherent power to decide when to defer, an ambiguous
congressional attitude simply means Congress has done nothing that would
require courts to desist from their existing practice of deference.
In addition, the model harmonizes better with established understandings
of constitutional structure. At a formal level, Chevron recognizes an omnipotent
Congress, which is envisioned as not only establishing substantive legal norms,
but also as directing the allocation of interpretative authority between executive
agencies and courts. But in practice, because of its fiction that Congress has
delegated the resolution of all ambiguities to the agencies charged with enforce-
ment of a statute, Chevron sanctions the exercise of vast executive powers
unchecked by meaningful judicial review.
The executive precedent model, like Chevron, posits that Congress has
ultimate power over the adoption of substantive legal norms. But the allocation
of interpretative authority between agencies and courts-at least for purposes
of judicial review-is determined by the courts themselves, absent some
superseding instruction from Congress. By grounding the practice of deference
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in the discretionary powers of courts, the executive precedent model permits
courts to continue to perform an important checking function in reviewing the
exercise of delegated power by agencies. In particular, courts would not be
required to identify a clear statutory violation before they could decline to
follow executive precedent. Other abuses of agency power-including decisions
that upset settled expectations, decisions that reflect agency bias, and decisions
that seek to expand agency power beyond the sphere contemplated but not
expressly spelled out by Congress-would also be subject to judicial correction.
2. Practical Failings
The executive precedent model, with its greater flexibility and openness
to a wider range of potentially relevant considerations, also avoids the major
practical failings of Chevron. By retaining flexibility about the relative weights
to be given executive precedent and independent judgment, the executive
precedent model avoids the extremes of Chevron, whereby the views of the
executive are given either too little or too much weight in virtually every case.
In particular, the model ensures that the executive branch view will always be
considered, rather than become relegated to a subset of cases in which courts
do not feel confident about exercising independent judgment. At a minimum,
therefore, the executive precedent model guarantees that the entity with the best
grasp of practical consequences-the executive agency-at least gets its views
on the table in every case.
The executive precedent model also sidesteps the need to adopt any particu-
lar theory of judicial interpretation in order to fix the point at which the court
will defer to executive judgment. The model can be wedded to any of the rival
methods of interpretation. It is based on a contextual assessment of the
"strength" of the executive precedent together with an independent judicial
assessment of statutory meaning, with no a priori specification of a single
legitimate method for ascertaining meaning.
Finally, the model is open to a wide range of contextual factors that courts
continue to regard as important. Under Chevron, the court is instructed to
decide whether to defer after looking at only one variable: whether the court
is entitled to exercise independent judgment. Other variables related to the
agency's authority and its performance are ignored. In effect, the decision
whether to defer is made with blinders on. Under the executive precedent
model, in contrast, the court looks at both sides of the equation: measuring first
the strength of the executive precedent and then considering this measurement
against an independent assessment of the clarity of the statute.
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B. Congruence with Practice
Perhaps even more impressive is the capacity of the executive precedent
model to explain various features of the deference doctrine, both the traditional
pre-Chevron understanding and the recent exceptions recognized under the
Chevron regime.
1. The Status of Pre-Chevron Factors Under the Executive Precedent
Model
Quite a number of the features of the deference doctrine as it existed in the
pre-Chevron era-features that were apparently banished by Chevron, but seem
to persist in the actual practice of the Court-suddenly become explicable once
we view the practice of deference as a form of following precedent. In particu-
lar, most of the deference factors have direct analogues in the practice that
courts observe when deciding whether to follow judicial precedent. And the few
factors that lack direct analogues have a commonsense basis and can be readily
accommodated to the executive precedent model.
(a) Deference As a Sliding Scale. Pre-Chevron practice, as we have seen,
treated deference as existing along a sliding scale, 17 7 whereas Chevron tends
to make deference an all-or-nothing proposition. Viewing deference as a form
of following precedent makes sense of the traditional approach. Where judicial
precedent is concerned, courts typically do not resolve questions of statutory
interpretation solely on the basis of precedent from courts of coordinate juris-
diction. Some nonbinding precedents are considered weightier than others, and
considerations drawn from the precedent of other courts are typically weighed
against the court's independent analysis of the meaning of the statute.78 Simi-
larly, under the executive precedent model, deference to executive views would
fall along a continuum, depending on the strength of the executive precedent
and the degree of confidence the court has in its independent view of the
statute's meaning.
(b) Express Delegations. Pre-Chevron cases also distinguished between
"legislative rules" and "interpretative rules." This construct has no direct
analogue in the realm of judicial precedent, no doubt because it is rare for
177. See supra text accompanying note 8.
178. See Colby v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (circuit court does not give
automatic deference to decisions of other circuits, but recognizes that "within reason, the parties to cases
before us are entitled to our independent judgment."); Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30
F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 280 U.S. 384 (1930) ("Much as we respect the
considered decisions of other circuits, we conceive that our duty requires us to form an independent
judgment in cases of first impression in our own court, and forbids us blindly to follow other circuits, when
our minds are not persuaded by the arguments advanced.").
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Congress expressly to delegate rulemaking power to courts.'t 9 Nevertheless,
the basic insight of the legislative/interpretative rule distinction is sound and
should be adopted to the executive precedent framework. Any express directive
from Congress about the allocation of interpretative authority would supersede
the internal norms. But such directives are rare. Short of an express allocation
of interpretative roles, a specific congressional grant of authority to agencies
in a particular area should be viewed as a congressional judgment of the superi-
or competence of the agency to develop legal norms in the area under consider-
ation, and thus should also result in greater deference to agency interpretations.
I would, however, reject one feature of the pre-Chevron approach to
legislative rules. Pre-Chevron case law tended to speak in all-or-nothing terms.
Either an agency interpretation was a "legislative rule" entitled to great defer-
ence, or it was an "interpretative rule" entitled only to whatever persuasive
effect it might have.' Unfortunately, this dichotomy tended to break down
in practice. Statutes granting general substantive rulemaking authority to
agencies, rather than specific authority to define a particular term, were particu-
larly problematic.'' I would avoid crude dichotomies by making the specifici-
ty of any express congressional delegation of regulatory authority one contextu-
al factor to be considered in determining the strength of the executive prece-
dent. The specificity of the grant from Congress, however, would not necessari-
ly override or negate other considerations.
(c) Agency Expertise. Pre-Chevron case law varied the degree of deference
according to whether the issue was one that implicated agency "expertise." This
idea is encountered less often in the realm of judicial precedent, but it is not
unheard of. For example, courts of appeals will occasionally give extra defer-
ence to decisions of other circuits that have greater familiarity with the substan-
tive body of law in question. 8 2 And courts quite commonly defer to interpre-
179. The principal exception is the Rules Enabling Act, which authorizes the Supreme Court to adopt
rules of civil procedure and evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). This delegation, however, concerns matters
of judicial self-governance, over which courts would presumably have inherent authority in the absence of
a legislative delegation. See Thomas Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHL L.
REV. 1, 46-47 (1985). Another arguable exception is the Sentencing Commission, on which three federal
judges sit. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the Supreme Court held that it was constitu-
tionally permissible for Congress to constitute the Sentencing Commission as part of the judicial branch,
even though it exercises substantive rulemaking authority.
180. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-25 & n.9 (1977); 1 DAVIS, supra note 6, at 421-22.
181. Some pre-Chevron cases suggested that interpretations adopted pursuant to general rulemaking
authority were entitled to less weight than interpretations more specifically authorized by Congress. See,
e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S.
247, 253 (1981). Other cases suggested that interpretations adopted pursuant to general rulemaking authority
were no different from specific authorizations. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582,594
(1981).
182. See City of Westfield v. Federal Power Comm'n, 551 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1977) (views of D.C.
Circuit, which reviews great bulk of Federal Power Commission orders, carry great weight when case
involving similar issue comes before other circuit); Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
("substantial weight" given to views of Court of Customs and Patent Appeals "as to technical or highly
specialized patent matters").
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tations of state law or procedural law by other courts that have greater experi-
ence with these localized legal regimes."8 3
The notion that specialized competence warrants deference naturally plays
a more prominent role in the executive precedent context because of the
specialized nature of administrative agencies. Common sense suggests that the
views of those with specialized knowledge about a subject are generally more
valuable than the views of those without such knowledge. Because agencies
are specialists, it follows that additional deference should be given to their
judgments within the area of their specialization. Thus, pre-Chevron case law
accorded extra deference to an agency's interpretations of the specific statute
it was charged with administering, but did not give any special deference to
other types of agency interpretations, such as constructions of common law
terms, constitutional principles, or prior judicial precedents, ts4 or to interpreta-
tions of statutes the agency did not ordinarily administer.18 5 The executive
precedent model would carry this general distinction forward, treating the
presence or absence of specialized agency knowledge as one of the factors to
be considered in determining the strength of agency precedent.
(d) Longstanding Interpretations. Pre-Chevron cases put great stress on
whether an agency interpretation was longstanding and consistent. This has a
direct analogue in practice regarding judicial precedent. Here too, the longevity
of the precedent is clearly an important factor in determining how much weight
it will be given.18 6 The case for giving greater weight to old precedents is
based primarily on two considerations. First, the fact that an interpretation has
survived for a long period of time is some evidence that it is sound, in the
sense that it is workable187 Unworkable interpretations generate discontent
that may result in congressional overruling, or modification or repudiation by
the court that initially offered the interpretation. The fact that none of this has
occurred is circumstantial evidence that the interpretation does not impose
undue costs on regulated entities or frustrate the basic objectives of the propo-
nents of the legislation.' Second, longstanding interpretations give rise to
183. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-46 n.10 (1976) (Supreme Court defers to interpretation
of state law adopted by lower federal courts that are "familiar with the intricacies and trends of local law
and practice"); Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(Federal Circuit adopts policy of following law of regional circuits with respect to procedural questions).
184. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977); Texas Gas Transmission
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1960); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 89 (1943).
185. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529 n.9 (1984); Alaska S.S. Co. v. United
States, 290 U.S. 256, 261-64 (1933).
186. See, e.g., California v. FERC, 110 S. Ct. 2024,2029 (1990) (referring to "the deference this Court
must accord to long-standing and well-entrenched decisions, especially those interpreting statutes that
underlie complex regulatory regimes"); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409,
421-22, 424 (1986) (refusing to overrule precedent followed for six decades notwithstanding extensive
changes in statutory framework and related doctrine).
187. See Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Similar points have been advanced in the literature seeking to explain why common law rules
tend to be efficient. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 249 (1976): George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the
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reliance interests that warrant judicial protection. One of the primary justifica-
tions for the practice of following judicial precedents is to promote stability in
the legal system by protecting these reliance interests. 189 Of course, the pre-
sumption in favor of old precedents is not irrefutable. Generally speaking,
however, the longer and more consistently a precedent has been followed, the
higher the burden is on the party seeking to overcome the precedent to explain
why it is infirm.'90
Given these judicial understandings, it is not surprising that the duration
of an executive interpretation is the most frequently encountered factor in the
pre-Chevron case law (and for that matter in the post-Chevron cases as well).
The rationale for giving weight to longstanding agency precedent is identical
to that for giving weight to judicial precedent: age is indicative of soundness
(in the sense of workability), and older interpretations generate reliance interests
deserving protection. 19' It is also true that longstanding agency precedent, like
longstanding judicial precedent, can be overruled. Courts can accommodate the
need for change by imposing a higher burden of explanation on an agency
reversing its own longstanding precedent than otherwise would be the case. 92
(e) Well-Reasoned Decisions. Beginning with Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,193
the Supreme Court's pre-Chevron cases also gave greater deference to "well-
reasoned" agency decisions. In determining whether to follow nonbinding
precedents in the judicial context, such as decisions of courts of coordinate
jurisdiction, courts frequently consider how persuasive the reasoning of the
other court is: whether it has considered all relevant arguments, supported the
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Ruben, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
189. See United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973) (stare decisis requires that people rely on the
Court's decisions and that they should not be penalized for such reliance); cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.
CL 2597, 2610 (1991) ("[Clonsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving
property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved.").
190. See Fink, 483 U.S. at 89, 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica
Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924) (Court will not lightly disturb rule settled by 45 years of judicial
construction with respect to rights arising under patent law).
191. The need to protect reliance interests has long been recognized as an important reason to defer
to longstanding executive interpretations. As the Court observed in one case:
[G]overnment is a practical affair intended for practical men. Both officers, law-makers and citizens
naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive Department-on the pre-
sumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize
into a regular practice. That presumption is not reasoning in a circle but the basis of a wise and quieting
rule that in determining the meaning of a statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given
to the usage itself-even when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation.
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472-73 (1915); see also Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327,
336 (1930); Logan v. Davis, 233 U.S. 613, 627 (1914); United States v. Burlington & Mo. River R.R., 98
U.S. 334, 341 (1879).
192. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (1991) ("Given the extensive notice
and comment rulemaking conducted by the Board, its careful analysis of the comments that it received, and
its well-reasoned justification for the new rule, we would not be troubled even if there were inconsistencies
between the current rule and prior NLRB pronouncements.'); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 416-26 (2d ed. 1985).
193. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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conclusion with a thorough explanation, and so forth.1" This is perfectly
sensible. Because the precedent of a coordinate tribunal is not binding, it must
compete with the court's independent analysis of the issue. Although there is
a general bias in favor of uniformity, and thus the precedent will be regarded
as prima facie correct, a poorly reasoned precedent obviously commands less
respect and requires that the second court dig more deeply in order to ascertain
for itself what the correct answer should be.
The same pattern is followed in the executive precedent context. Here, the
pre-Chevron case law could, if anything, have done more to emphasize the
importance of careful agency reasoning. Where agency factfinding and policy
judgments are concerned, courts have come to insist that agencies take a "hard
look" at the relevant variables and options. 195 There is no reason why the
preference for rigor should 'not extend to legal interpretations.
(f) Interagency Agreement. Pre-Chevron case law reduced the degree of
deference where two agencies were in disagreement about the proper interpreta-
tion of a statute. This practice also makes sense if we think of deference as a
form of following precedent. Where a court faces conflicting precedents from
different jurisdictions, it is much less likely to defer to one of those interpreta-
tions than it would where the precedent from other jurisdictions is unani-
mous.196 Here too, we see how the executive precedent model can rationalize
pre-Chevron practice and integrate it with general norms of judicial self-gover-
nance.
(g) Contemporaneous Interpretations. A particularly venerable pre-Chevron
factor laid stress on whether the agency interpretation was contemporaneous
with the enactment of the statute. Because courts are generally not active
participants in the process of formulating legislation, the views of a contempo-
rary court are not necessarily probative of the thinking of the drafters of a
statute. There is, however, a more direct analogue in constitutional law: the idea
that courts should give deference to the views of the first Congress with respect
to the meaning of the Constitution.197 The views of the first Congress are
thought to be especially revealing because so many of the members of that
Congress were active participants in the framing and ratification of the Consti-
194. See, e.g., Richards v. Local 134, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 790 F.2d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1986);
City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops of D.C., Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also Oneida
County Fair Bd. v. Smylie, 386 P.2d 374, 391 (Idaho 1963) (state supreme court will select and apply
decisions from other jurisdictions that reflect soundest reasoning.)
195. The general tenets of the "hard look" doctrine have been said to be: (1) agencies must offer
detailed explanations for their decisions; (2) they must explain departures from past practices; (3) they must
allow effective participation by affected interests; and (4) they must give consideration to possible alternative
measures. Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 181-82. For
examples of "hard look" review in the Supreme Court, see Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610,
627 (1986); Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-44 (1983);
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. National Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1983).
196. See Vestal, supra note 158, at 163-65.
197. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790
(1983).
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tution, and thus presumably had special insight into the original understanding.
In effect, the decisions of the first Congress are viewed as one form of legisla-
tive branch "precedent" entitled to deference by the courts.
The rationale for the contemporaneous construction factor in administrative
law is similar to that in the constitutional context. It has been observed that
agency officials are often "the draftsmen of the laws they are afterwards called
upon to interpret." 198 Even if agency actors did not participate directly in the
formulation of the legislation, their contemporaneous interpretation can be
regarded as indicative of the prevailing views about policy, given that the
administrative agency often shares the same assumptions that animate the
legislature.199 Like its constitutional cousin, the administrative doctrine has
somewhat limited value, and goes more to the judicial discernment of congres-
sional intent than to ascertaining the "strength" of the executive precedent.
Moreover, I suspect that many of the references to contemporary constructions,
especially in the earlier cases, are synonyms for longstanding construction.
Nevertheless, even when used in its correct signification, there is no harm in
incorporating it as one factor in the decisional matrix, as long as its rationale
is clearly perceived.
(h) Ratified Interpretations. Finally, pre-Chevron cases often placed weight
on evidence that Congress had ratified the executive construction. The idea that
interpretations are entitled to greater deference if they have been ratified by
Congress also has a precise parallel in the world of judicial precedent. Congress
is presumed to be aware of the way statutes have been interpreted by courts.
If one court adopts a particular interpretation, and Congress later reenacts the
statute without substantively changing the interpreted language, then it is
presumed that Congress has approved the interpretation.2" The doctrine can
be explained by a kind of "squeaky wheel" theory of the legislative process
similar to that which underlies (in part) the longstanding interpretation factor.
If the initial interpretation generates discontent-in the sense that it imposes
large costs on particular interest groups-then we can presume that those
groups will bring it to the attention of Congress; if Congress agrees, it will
amend the statute to overturn the interpretation. By the same token, if Congress
reenacts a statute after judicial interpretation without changing the language,
that is some evidence that the interpretation has not generated great discontent.
Because the doctrine makes some rather heroic assumptions, it should be
used with caution. One problem relates to the assumption that Congress is
aware of judicial interpretations of statutes. This may be contrary to fact if the
interpretation affects large and diffuse interests that have difficulty organizing
198. United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1888).
199. See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 126 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
200. See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-68 (1988); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
580 (1978). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MIcH. L. REV.
67, 70-84 (1988).
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for legislative action.2"' Another problem is presented by those cases that find
congressional ratification based on the failure of Congress to enact proposed
legislation. Legislative inaction is always inherently ambiguous and could
reflect nothing more than a crowded legislative agenda. But as long as ratifica-
tion is limited to cases where at least the relevant committees have been
informed of an interpretation, and Congress reenacts the relevant legislation
without change, it is probably a useful doctrine.
The administrative ratification doctrine-a staple of pre-Chevron case
law-has exactly the same logic and limitations as the judicial ratification
doctrine. Administrative interpretations can be just as important to interest
groups as judicial interpretations, and we can expect that the interpretations that
make well-organized interest groups unhappy will come to the attention of
Congress. Thus, subject to the caveats noted about the judicial ratification
version, congressional ratification is a permissible factor for courts to use in
ascertaining the weight of executive precedent.
2. The Post-Chevron Exceptions Under the Executive Precedent Model
The executive precedent model also makes sense of some of the disputes
over Chevron fundamentals that have erupted in recent years. In each case, the
model suggests that there are sound reasons to deviate from the logic of
Chevron.
(a) Interpretations Beyond Agency Authority. In Adams Fruit Co. v.
Barrett,02 the Court held that agency interpretations are entitled to no defer-
ence if they concern a topic that the agency has not been empowered to regu-
late. In effect, Adams Fruit carries Chevron's presumed delegation theory to
its ultimate conclusion. Since the delegation of regulatory authority gives rise
to the duty to defer, where there is no delegated power there is no deference.
Pre-Chevron case law was more refined. When an agency spoke about a
matter as to which it had no power to regulate, its views were still entitled to
consideration by courts, provided they bore other indicia that would entitle them
to respect. This was the holding of Skidmore.0 3 The executive precedent
model would adhere to this pre-Chevron understanding, rather than to Adams
Fruit. If an agency's interpretation qualifies as executive precedent and has
other attributes that suggest it is entitled to deference, there is no reason why
it should not be given appropriate weight as a form of precedent. For example,
agencies often have specialized knowledge about the operations of a particular
industry and the way it is affected by a statutory scheme. If the agency has
issued an interpretative regulation or policy statement that provides a reasoned
201. See MANCUR OLsON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
202. 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990).
203. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
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analysis of the way the statute should be read, its views should be entitled to
some weight, even if does not have day-to-day regulatory authority over the
matter in contention. Adams Fruit is the wooden product of a conceptual
scheme that all too often forecloses potentially valuable lines of inquiry, and
it should be rejected.
(b) Post hoc Rationalizations. In contrast, the Court's decision to exclude
"post hoc rationalizations" of counsel from Chevron deference' is not con-
sistent with the logic of Chevron. As long as the question concerns a matter
delegated to the agency, Chevron suggests it should not matter how or when
the agency announces its interpretation.
The "post hoc rationalization" exception, however, conforms to pre-Chev-
ron case law,205 and can be explained by the executive precedent model. As
noted above, post hoc rationalizations are simply not "precedents." They are
interpretations first advanced by an agency in its capacity as a party litigant,
not in its capacity as an independent decisionmaker. Thus, any deference to
agency views in this context would offend ideals of judicial impartiality.
(c) Canons of Construction. The Court has also suggested that certain
canons of construction-most notably, the canon that interpretations of doubtful
constitutionality are to be avoided-may trump the Chevron doctrine. 6 Chev-
ron itself supplies no rationale for such a holding. Under the executive prece-
dent model, in contrast, courts may consult any traditional tool of interpretation
in arriving at an assessment of the clarity of statutory meaning. Canons that
serve as default rules in the absence of more direct evidence of congressional
intent should not play a major part in this exercise. If there is no better means
of resolving a question of interpretation than calling upon such a canon, then,
as a general rule, the executive interpretation should not be set aside. On the
other hand, canons grounded in considerations of constitutional law and struc-
ture 7 may supply a stronger basis for overcoming executive precedent.
(d) Judicial Precedent. In Maislin Industries, U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc.,
the Court held that an agency cannot change its mind about the meaning of a
statute if by doing so it "casts doubt on [the Court's] prior interpretation" of
the statute.20 1 This conclusion remains a mystery under Chevron, but makes
perfect sense under the executive precedent model. It is useful here to return
to the judicial analogy. Although one court of appeals should treat a decision
of another court of appeals as prima facie correct, the precedent of the second
204. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines
v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1968)).
205. See. e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1978); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S.
617, 628 (1971); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1943).
206. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
574-75 (1988).
207. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2403-06 (1991) (adopting canon that statute will
not be construed to interfere with traditional state governmental functions absent clear congressional
statement indicating intent that it be so applied).
208. Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2770 (1990).
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court-however well reasoned and consistently followed-cannot overcome the
force of the court's own precedent. °9 Stare decisis prevails over the deference
given to precedents of other circuits.
Similarly, an executive precedent cannot outweigh a directly applicable
judicial precedent. Of course, the executive view may provide an occasion for
the courts to reconsider their own precedent, just as contrary decisions from
other circuits may often trigger en bane reconsideration by courts of ap-
peals. 210 But such a change at best constitutes an appeal to the discretion of
the court to overrule its prior precedent under the criteria of stare decisis; it
does not impose an obligation on the courts to change their views or even to
engage in a reconsideration. Thus, the executive precedent renders the outcome
in Maislin perfectly explicable.
(e) Decisions Implicating Agency Jurisdiction. In Mississippi Power &
Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore,2" Justices Brennan and Scalia engaged
in an inconclusive debate over whether an exception to Chevron should be
created for interpretations that implicate the limits of an agency's jurisdiction.
This issue is particularly ill suited to sweeping, either/or solutions. A rule
precluding deference on issues that implicate an agency's jurisdiction would
accomplish indirectly what Cardoza-Fonseca sought to do directly: it would
eliminate any deference on "pure" questions of statutory interpretation. This
is because almost any purely legal question will have implications for the scope
of an agency's authority. At the same time, courts have long operated with a
kind of unwritten understanding that deference to agency views is not appro-
priate, at least not to the same degree, where the agency view is likely to be
influenced by institutional bias.212 For example, courts do not defer to agency
views on whether agency decisions are judicially reviewable, whether agency
action falls within the terms of the Federal Torts Claims Act, whether agencies
are liable to pay attorney's fees, or whether agency documents must be dis-
closed under the Freedom of Information Act.1 3 For similar reasons, at least
a lesser degree of deference may be warranted when an agency decides to
regulate a new area: the decision to regulate may be motivated by designs for
agency aggrandizement rather than by a disinterested assessment of statutory
authority and appropriate policy.
The executive precedent model permits courts to give effect to concerns
about institutional bias in determining whether deference is appropriate. In the
209. E.g., Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391, 1394 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated
sub nom. Zohdi v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 490 U.S. 1001 (1989).
210. See FED. R. APP. P. 35.
211. 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
212. See Braun, supra note 106, at 1005-07, Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2101.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) (judicial review); Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552 (1988) (attorney's fees); CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) (Freedom of Information Act);
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984)
(Federal Torts Claims Act).
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most egregious cases of agency bias-for example, where the issue is whether
an agency decision is subject to judicial review-there may well be no execu-
tive precedent since the issue arises only when the agency is engaged in its role
as a judicial litigant. In the more difficult case where an agency has concluded
that its statutory mandate permits a new industry or activity to be regulated (or
deregulated), the executive precedent model permits-as is appropriate-a more
modulated response. The concern with possible agency bias justifies reducing
the degree of deference without disregarding agency views and arguments
altogether. In contrast, the rigid Chevron doctrine demands that courts either
defer or not defer, permitting a court to disregard an agency's conclusions only
if it can identify a clear statutory mandate that has been violated. Again, the
more flexible approach better serves the separation of powers concerns fur-
thered by the practice of independent judicial review.
All in all, the executive precedent model makes sense of a great deal of
learning previously regarded as an unconnected hodgepodge of factors with no
unifying theme or rationale. The persistence of these traditional factors in the
face of an official doctrine that is hostile to their survival suggests that there
is value in this conventional wisdom. The congruence between the executive
precedent model and observations of conventional practice provides powerful
support for the model's validity.
C. Consequences for Judicial and Agency Performance
Finally, it is important to give some consideration to the systemic effects
that the executive precedent model might have relative to the Chevron model.
Of course, in undertaking any such inquiry, one must bear in mind that the
Chevron model operates quite differently in practice than it does on paper.
1. Consequences for Courts
Proponents of the Chevron doctrine are attracted almost exclusively by the
prospect that its formal or rulelike qualities will confine judicial discretion.
Restricting judicial discretion is thought to be desirable in this context for both
* instrinsic and extrinsic reasons.
The intrinsic reason is that restrictions on judicial discretion are thought
to be necessary if we are to speak of courts as being bound by "law. '214
Whatever the theoretical or practical failings of Chevron, or its discontinuities
with past (and present) judicial practice, it at least has the appearance of a legal
rule rather than an "all things considered" standard. Justice Scalia, probably
214. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHLi. L. REv. 1175 (1989). For
a general discussion, see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
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the foremost champion of the Chevron doctrine,21 is clearly attracted to this
feature of Chevron. From this perspective, the executive precedent model is not
sufficiently rulelike: it imports so many factors that the practice of deference
would degenerate into an ad hoc inquiry that would allow courts to reach any
result they wanted to. Moreover, with so many factors from which to choose,
effective review or oversight by the Supreme Court would be impossible.2 16
While there is clearly some merit to this criticism, I would offer several points
by way of response.
First, although my proposed executive precedent model is clearly more
open textured than Chevron, I do not think that it can fairly be described as
"lawless." Unlike the pre-Chevron regime that it resembles, the executive
precedent model endorses neither ad hockery nor an open-ended "list of
factors" approach. Instead, it offers a theory that explains the respective roles
of the executive and judicial branches, tells us which deference factors are
relevant and why, and provides an account, in general terms at least, of how
the court is to consider the executive view relative to its own assessment of the
interpretative question. The model may be complex-too complex to be reduced
to a simple Chevron-like formula-but it is not "unprincipled." Nor can it be
said that the model prescribes an ad hoc balancing test. Such tests require courts
to engage in a "head-to-head comparison" of competing interests. 217 The
executive precedent model, in contrast, is grounded in analogical reasoning,
whereby various factors become relevant in determining whether a particular
case approximates a particular paradigm. In this sense, it is simply a variant
on what is perhaps the most universal tool of legal reasoning.218
Second, to a considerable extent, the case for legal formalism is much
stronger where rules of primary behavior are concerned than it is when we are
dealing with rules of legal method. When courts adopt "all things considered"
tests for the governance of primary behavior, serious questions can be raised
about whether similarly situated persons are in fact treated alike.219 But it is
hard to see how the equality norm is offended, at least to anything approaching
the same degree, when an issue of statutory interpretation is resolved in one
case using one set of interpretative tools and a different issue of statutory
interpretation is resolved in another case using other interpretative tools. As
long as the outcome of each exercise of statutory interpretation is applied
215., See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133-34 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (applauding the Court for abandoning the limiting approach of Cardoza-Fonseca); Scalia,
supra note 39.
216. See Scalia, supra note 214, at 1178-82 (criticizing multifactor tests for transforming questions
of law into questions of fact and for insulating lower courts from effective appellate review).
217. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 945
(1987).
218. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1949).
219. Scalia, supra note 214, at 1178.
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consistently, the individuals primarily affected will generally perceive that they
are being treated equally.
Third, the claim that Chevron allows the Supreme Court to control the
behavior of lower courts, whereas the executive precedent model would not,
cannot be based on the Chevron doctrine as we currently know it-where the
two-step framework is ignored as often as it is followed, and when followed,
is applied in several different versions. But even if the Court were to adhere
to a "pure" version of Chevron, there would still be ample opportunities for
manipulation, most prominently through spurious identifications of "specific
intentions" or "plain" statutory meanings. Thus, even though Chevron is more
formalistic than the executive precedent model, it too cannot constrain willful-
ness in the lower courts. To be sure, there is no basis for believing that the
executive precedent model would impose greater constraints on lower courts
than would a rigorously and consistently applied Chevron. But I do think it
likely that the decision to defer under the executive precedent model would be
made in a more candid manner, with more revealing reasons given in support
of judicial outcomes. The relevant choice, therefore, may not be between
constrained and unconstrained judicial decisions, but between more or less
judicial candor.
Finally, I seriously doubt whether it would ever be possible to decide all
deference questions without being drawn into some type of contextual or
multivariate inquiry, call it "pragmatism" or "practical reasoning" or whatev-
er.22 As Judge Stephen Breyer has observed, "there are too many different
types of circumstances, including different statutes, different kinds of applica-
tion, different substantive regulatory or administrative problems, and different
legal postures in which cases arrive, to allow 'proper' judicial attitudes about
questions of law to be reduced to any single simple verbal formula."'" The
fact that the Court is now creating various ad hoc exceptions and alternative
formulations of the Chevron doctrine suggests the beginnings of a process
whereby the apparent simplicity of Chevron is tempered with a variety of
qualifying rules. When we start with the two-step Chevron framework and then
create these exceptions, we end up with a crazy patchwork that lacks any
internal coherence. The executive precedent model, by admitting a wider variety
of variables in a more contextualized relationship at the outset, can avoid the
need for this kind of improvised structure.
The extrinsic reason for wanting to constrain judicial discretion by formal
rules is that this would enhance the ability of agencies to change the law. It is
no accident that many of the principal defenders of Chevron-including Justice
220. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 286-309 (1990) (urging pragmatic
approach to statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 319 (1990).
221. Breyer, supra note 175, at 373.
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Scalia and Judges Starr and Silberman-all served in the first Reagan Ad-
ministration, when an aggressively conservative executive branch sought
widespread change in the law and encountered resistance from both Congress
and the judiciary. These defenders endorse Chevron as a tool for translating the
electoral mandate of the President into legal reform, thereby overcoming the
resistance of the other two branches of government.
This rationale for Chevron, however, is obviously limited to a particular
set of historical circumstances-circumstances that have already been at least
in part superseded by the appointment of increasing numbers of federal judges
by Presidents Reagan and Bush. What is needed is a formula that strikes a more
enduring balance between executive, legislative, and judicial perspectives, and
between the forces of change and stability.
The executive precedent model envisions a larger role for the judiciary than
does the original version of Chevron. However, as previously indicated, this
larger role is necessary if courts are to perform their traditional function of
checking administrative abuses of power.223 On the other hand, I do not think
that the discretionary nature of the executive precedent model would cause
courts to engage in wholesale substitution of judgment for agency interpreta-
tions. Other rules grounded in judicial self-governance, most prominently the
understanding that courts must follow precedents of superior courts and the
doctrine of stare decisis, exert a powerful influence over the manner in which
courts resolve legal controversies. There is no reason why the deference
doctrine, understood as a form of respect given to legal interpretations by
another branch of government of coordinate constitutional status, should not
also exert an important influence over judicial behavior.
To be sure, by stressing the importance of reliance factors such as long-
standing and consistent agency interpretation, contemporaneous interpretation,
and congressional ratification, the executive precedent model is also more
resistant to rapid change in law than is Chevron. But again, I think this is
healthy. Chevron is a doctrine for Jacobeans: the results of a single Presidential
election are a sufficient cause for wholesale modifications in the law, with no
offsetting incentive for stability or protection of reliance interests. Surely, it is
rather odd for Whiggish conservatives like Justice Scalia-who speak glowingly
of legal formalism because it promotes predictability in the law,' and who
eloquently defend a strict separation of powers in order to prevent undue
concentrations of power that pose a threat to liberty and private rights--to
endorse Jacobean measures.
222. See Scalia, supra note 39; Silberman, supra note 44. Starr, supra note 34; see alsoJudicalReview
ofAdministrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353 (1987) (panel discussion including
Judge Starr and Richard Willard, a Justice Department official in the Reagan Administration).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
224. Scalia, supra note 214, at 1179.
225. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
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The executive precedent model would strike a better balance between
stability and change. By giving greater deference to longstanding, contempora-
neous, and ratified agency interpretations, it would introduce a bias in favor
of stability, and would give a measure of protection to the reliance interests that
these interpretations have generated. 6 But this model would not rule out
change, provided that the reasons for change are clearly articulated and the new
interpretation is consistent with the statutory framework. Thus, it would not
"freeze" the law or preclude legal development in response to changed percep-
tions of policy, whether caused by Presidential elections or otherwise.
2. Consequences for Agencies
When we turn from the consequences for judicial behavior to the effects
on agency behavior, the balance sheet wholly favors the executive precedent
model. The Chevron framework essentially provides no incentives for agency
behavior. It focuses at both steps one and two almost exclusively on variables
relevant only to judicial functioning. The executive precedent model, in con-
trast, pays equal attention to the caliber and quality of the agency's precedent,
and by making the weight of the agency's precedent relevant to the decision
to defer, provides incentives for agencies to engage in certain types of behavior
rather than others. Three incentives, in particular, would be introduced by the
executive precedent approach.
The first is the incentive to maintain a consistent position over time.
Consistency is desirable insofar as it promotes equality of treatment between
similarly situated parties, protects reliance interests, and renders administrative
action more predictable, thereby allowing private parties to engage in meaning-
ful planning.2?7 Consistency may also reduce "rent seeking" in the form of
expenditures of resources designed to influence agencies to change their
interpretations of the law? 8
On the other hand, a rigid rule of "first in time, first in right" would
eliminate one of the advantages of using agencies to implement law: the
possibility of modifying policy over time as experience accumulates and
conditions and public perceptions change. And a rule making the first interpre-
tation controlling might induce excessive expenditures to influence the initial
construction of the law. The executive precedent model strikes an appropriate
226. See Monaghan, supra note 147, at 751-52 (practice of judicial adherence to precedent fosters
conservative values).
227. It is no coincidence that these are some of the same values served by formal rules of law. See
Scalia, supra note 39. For traditional administrative law statements endorsing greater agency consistency,
see, e.g., BREYER & STEWART, supra note 192: 4 DAVIS. supra note 6, § 20:11.
228. This point was suggested to me by my colleague Keith Hylton. See Keith Hylton, Doctrinal
Efficiency and Labor Law (Aug. 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (discussing possible
rent-seeking responses to frequent changes in National Labor Relations Board doctrine).
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balance between these concerns by demanding either agency consistency or a
persuasive explanation for change as a condition for deference.
The second relevant incentive is the attempt to strive for harmony among
different agencies. It is always difficult to maintain coherence in our sprawling
bureaucratic state. Various mechanisms for centralized control exist, including
preclearance of regulations by the Office of Management and Budget?9 and
preclearance of judicial appeals by the Solicitor General."0 But the centripetal
forces tend always to overpower the centrifugal. The idea that agency interpre-
tations that conflict with other agency interpretations will lose a measure of
judicial deference adds another small incentive for internal coherence.
The third is the incentive to provide reasoned explanations for statutory
interpretations. It is "anomalous"1' that agency factfinding and policymaking
is today subject to searching review under the "hard look" doctrine, which
requires a careful consideration of relevant factors and an answer to prominent
objections by affected parties. 2 Under Chevron, however, agency interpreta-
tions of law are subject to automatic deference unless the court finds that the
matter has been clearly resolved by Congress. Paradoxically, therefore, official
doctrine requires more searching judicial review on questions of fact and
policy-where agencies are traditionally thought to enjoy a comparative advan-
tange-than on questions of law, where the traditional view was that courts held
the edge.2
33
One of the promising features of the executive precedent model is that it
would tend to incorporate some of the features of "hard look" review into the
process of considering whether to give deference to executive interpretations
of statutes. The strength of an agency precedent would to a significant extent
be a function of how carefully the agency considered the question of interpreta-
tion, responded to objections, and offered reasons in support of the interpreta-
tion adopted. In effect, an agency that has given a "hard look" at a question
of interpretation will be entitled to greater deference than an agency that has
given only cursory consideration to the issue.
3. Consequences for Congress
Finally, it is worth speculating briefly about what sorts of incentives a
rigorously enforced Chevron would create for Congress. It is unlikely that
Congress would stand idly by in response to a major realignment in the division
of powers that enhanced the executive branch's ability to institute policy
229. As required by Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127. (198 1), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 1075 (1986).
230. See 28 C.F.R. § 0,20(b) (1991).
231. Breyer, supra note 175, at 397.
232. See sources cited supra note 195.
233. See Diver, supra note 11, at 574.
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changes and minimized the role of the courts in checking administrative abuses.
One would expect some combination of three responses from Congress, none
of which in my view would be desirable.
Perhaps the most straightforward congressional response would be to enact
longer and more detailed statutes.' t If the only things courts will enforce are
specific directives, then Congress would try to supply as many specific direc-
tives as possible. While some might hail this development as a healthy reasser-
tion of the "legislative power" by its constitutional instrument,215 there is
reason to believe that an upsurge in the specificity of legislation would lead
to bad policy2 6 and more influence by private interest groups.137 There can
be little doubt that it would add to the complexity-and incomprehensibili-
ty-of the legal system.
Another possible congressional response would be to seek greater influence
over administrative agencies. This might take the form of direct restrictions on
Presidential authority over agency heads. More likely, it would manifest itself
in the form of more intensive oversight hearings and contacts between congres-
sional staff and agency personnel.s The result, again, would be an erosion
of coherence and greater interest group influence.239
Third, Congress might attempt to overrule Chevron directly, perhaps by
enacting some form of the Bumpers Amendment. 240 As previously indicated,
I think that Congress has the constitutional power to direct courts to adandon
the Chevron approach. But such a response would very likely take the form of
an overreaction-as the Bumpers Amendment surely would be-and at the very
least would create a troubling precedent for congressional intervention in
matters traditionally left to evolutionary judicial development.
Of course, the chance of these responses occurring will be reduced if the
Court continues to create exceptions to the Chevron doctrine and to ignore it
altogether. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the executive precedent
approach-which is more consistent with historic practice and promises to
result in a more balanced judicial role-would provide even greater assurances
against undesirable congressional reactions.
234. Hertz, supra note 113, at 1675.
235. See, e.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-33 (1980) (criticizing excessive
delegation of legislative authority on democratic theory grounds); J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary
Justice, 81 YALE LJ. 575, 584-86 (1972) (urging revival of nondelegation doctrine).
236. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAlIDIRTY AIR (1981) (arguing
that highly detailed provisions in 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments impeded EPA'S ability to develop
effective policy).
237. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, I J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 81 (1985) (public choice theory suggests that interest groups will have greater
influence in legislative arena than in administrative arena).
238. See Lazarus, supra note 118.
239. See Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality. Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REv. 207 (1984)
(discussing interest group influence exerted through congressional oversight process).
240. See supra note I11.
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VI. CONCLUSION
From the perspective of this Article, the long controversy over judicial
deference to administrative interpretations of statutes can be seen as a rivalry
between two competing models: the mandatory deference model and the
discretionary deference model. The rivalry has been largely unconscious
because the assumptions of the mandatory deference model are often unstated,
and the theoretical basis for the discretionary deference model has never been
previously articulated. Still, we can see these ideas struggling for dominance
in judicial practice.
In the pre-Chevron era, the two models coexisted uneasily. Courts applied
the mandatory deference model to interpretations backed by express delegations
of regulatory authority from Congress. But in the absence of an express delega-
tion, they applied something that in retrospect looks very much like the discre-
tionary deference model--examining various contextual factors that could be
applied just as easily to a precedent of a court of coordinate jurisdiction as to
the construction of an executive branch agency. The Chevron era on paper
represents a rejection of the discretionary approach and an embrace of a pure
mandatory regime. Now, however, the realm of mandatory deference has vastly
expanded to include a presumption of delegation in all cases where a federal
statute is ambiguous or unclear. As we have seen, however, in practice the
discretionary approach has lived on, in the shadows of Chevron, and in consid-
erable tension with its expanded delegation theory.
Chevron's many failings are largely those of the mandatory deference
model that it incorporates. Although the idea of express delegation is straight-
forward enough, the concept of an implied delegation of interpretative authority
is difficult to characterize as a congressional command. The focus on delegation
also makes the decision about whether to defer subordinate to the resolution
of a question of judicial interpretation: Did Congress (constructively) delegate,
or did it not? In this fashion, consideration of the executive view becomes
ensnared in controversies over the legitimate scope of judicial interpretation.
Finally, the idea of delegation requires that deference be viewed in either/or
terms: either Congress delegated authority, or it did not; no intermediate possi-
bilities make sense. The either/or nature of the mandatory deference theory
based on delegated power pushes the doctrine toward extremes of either too
little or too much deference.
I have argued that a better solution to the uneasy mixture of the
pre-Chevron period would have been to move to a pure discretionary regime,
what I have called the executive precedent model. The idea of delegation would
not disappear in such a regime. It would simply revert to its original scope of
express delegation, and it would become one of several factors that courts
would examine in determining the "strength" of an executive precedent. Be-
cause the practice of deference under the executive precedent model is grounded
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in a conception of the judicial power rather than in a fiction of delegation, it
avoids the major theoretical failings of the Chevron doctrine. In addition, it
allows courts to consider various attributes of the executive decision that seem
undeniably relevant to the question of how much weight it should be given:
such as whether the agency's interpretation is supported by careful reasoning,
whether its interpretation has generated reliance interests that should be protect-
ed, and whether its construction has been approved by Congress. The executive
precedent model also permits a flexible response to the question of deference,
allowing courts to give various degrees of deference to executive interpretations,
depending on the strength of the contextual factors involved and on the court's
conviction about the clarity of the statute as an original matter.
Like its close cousin, the doctrine of judicial precedent, the model of
executive precedent does not admit of easy or pat answers. But this does not
mean it has nothing to say about what variables are relevant to its operation
and why they are significant. In this respect, one of the significant benefits of
the executive precedent model is that it might teach us something about the
practice of following judicial precedent, of which legal academics have unfortu-
nately had far too little to say.
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